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There have been significant priorities among tax practitioners and policymakers about 
corporate tax planning. There are many ways firms can avoid tax. However, we know very 
little about how firms learn about different tax avoidance mechanisms. One of the crucial 
channels is common owners, specifically common institutional blockholders (CIB’s), who 
potentially hold a momentous role in expediting the diffusion of tax avoidance knowledge 
across firms. Do firms engage in a similar level of tax avoidance if they share the same 
CIB’s? We investigate this question using the Common Ownership Data and 
Compustat/CRSP balance sheet data via Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). Our final 
sample results in 23,603 (23,015) observations from 1999 to 2016 using GAAP ETR (cash 
ETR) as tax avoidance measure, from the raw data of around a 48million observations of 
holding information.  
 
Similar to a prior study by Cheng, Sun & Xie (2018), our empirical results support that firms 
follow their peers held by the same CIBs in making their tax avoidance strategies. We 
examine the causality of the peer effect on the focal firm. It is supplemented with other 
analyses using exogenous events, i.e., tax rate shock among peer firms. We acknowledge that 
companies operating in the same industry share the same firm-level characteristics; to 
proscribe this effect, our models look at peer firms with different SIC-code in relation to the 
focal firm. In addition, we conduct an event study on the investor level to observe 
blockholders adjust their portfolio weights when there is a shock in the focal firm’s ETR. 
However, the effect is limited to using cash ETR only, with blockholder adjust their portfolio 
when there is a negative cash ETR event. We also conduct an analysis that differentiates 
between short- and long-term blockholders.  
 
Our findings suggest that there is a positive interrelation between GAAP (Cash) ETR and 
PEER ETR. The SIC-code model indicates that investors are proved to drive the effect we see 
instead of latent industry-based characteristics. Furthermore, we find that short-term 
blockholders have more impact on the focal firm’s tax adjustment. Overall, our finding 
supports the hypothesis that firms engage in similar levels of tax avoidance if common 
blockholders own them. Our results support the tax avoidance effect is not driven by 






Further, our study aims to document a potentially vital channel for tax avoidance diffusion 
through CIBs. We hope that this thesis contributes to taxation and public finance by 
constructing and analysing the impact of common ownership through strategic tax avoidance 
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Common ownership is described as where two firms are at least partially owned by the same 
investor, and this phenomenon is rising among competing publicly held U.S. firms. Nearly 
25% of the U.S. stock market is now held by index funds, a rapid increase from 15% in the 
early 2000s. The world’s three largest index funds (Blackrock, Vanguard, and Fidelity) are 
now holding a total of 18,17 trillion dollars under its management, including shares in many 
of the U.S.’s largest firms. The rise of common ownership has captured attention from 
academics and practitioners about the significant effect of this phenomenon on a firm’s 
strategic choices (Easterbrook & Fischel, 1982; Hansen & Lott, 1996; Rubin, 2006), among 
which might be concerned about possible behaviour such as corporate tax planning.  
 
In this paper, we try to answer how firms learn about different tax avoidance mechanisms, 
specifically via common owners. We examine whether firms engage in the same level of tax 
avoidance if the same institutional blockholders own them. 
 
 
II. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Determinants of tax avoidance  
 
It is a major area of interest to examine determinants, magnitudes, and consequences of 
corporate tax avoidance (Hanlon & Heitzman, 2010). For example, Shackelford & Shevlin 
(2001) state that we know little about cross-sectional differences in the willingness of firms to 
avoid taxes and encourage accountants to participate in tax-related research. Companies, just 
as individuals, vary in their tax aggressiveness.  Questions arise about the determinants of 
such tax aggressiveness. Related to this paper, ownership structure is the determinant of 
interest. Desai & Dharmapala (2009) is a study in which they used institutional ownership as 
a proxy to measure the quality of firm governance when they were to study how the quality of 
firm governance affects tax avoidance on firm values. 
 






Several previous studies have also examined how ownership structure affects tax avoidance. 
Chen, Chen, Cheng, & Shevlin (2010) use ownership structure as a determinant to investigate 
tax avoidance. Specifically, they distinguish between family-owned companies and non-
family-owned companies and find evidence that family-owned companies are less tax 
aggressive than non-family-owned companies. Another study uses a different variant of the 
ownership structure determinant and looks at how activist hedge funds affect tax avoidance 
(Cheng, Huang, Li, & Stanfield, 2012). Hedge fund activists buy into companies that perform 
poorly, hoping to change the company’s firm value. Their finding is that targeted firms get an 
increased tax avoidance after interference from hedge fund activists. Furthermore, Khurana & 
Moser (2013) examines whether the level of institutional ownership with a long-term horizon 
is associated with the company’s tax avoidance. They find evidence that there is less tax 
avoidance in firms held by long-term institutional owners. 
 
In our studies, we also use ownership structure as a determinant to investigate the effect of tax 
avoidance. Our variant is based on Cheng, Sun, & Xie (2018) that we look at common 
institutional ownership and investigate whether there is knowledge sharing across firms with 
the same institutional owners. Hence, we study the peer effects of tax avoidance for firms who 
have the same institutional owners following Cheng, Sun, & Xie (2018). From what we have 
found, only the article mentioned above defines the peer group similarly as we do in our 
analysis. 
 
Furthermore, we respond to Hanlon & Heitzman (2010), who mention that ownership 
structure might be an exciting determinant for examining the effect of tax avoidance. 
 
2.3 Framework for network ties studies 
 
There are many ways to study social network ties. Carpenter, Li & Jiang (2012) serve 
framework to guide scholars in conducting social network research in terms of research about 
interpersonal level or inter-organizational level. They propose whether to conduct social 
capital research or network development research. Social capital research means research that 
looks at network causes and predictors. In contrast, network development research is based on 
the network itself being the consequence and examining this formation and change. Following 
this framework, we are in our study in social capital research since we look at peer firms as 
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predictors for focal firms’ ETR’s. Furthermore, we are within the inter-organizational level to 
the extent that the institutional investors are organizations and not people. 
 
2.4 Board interlocks as peer group definition 
 
Other studies look at the effect of interpersonal linkages, such as the consequences on loan 
terms when people in the management have attended the same school or worked together with 
those applying for loans (Engelberg, Gao, & Parsons, 2012). 
 
Gulati & Westphal (1999) find evidence that board interlocks can influence the formation of 
strategic alliances between companies, especially if there is no significant degree of 
independent control over the board and a large degree of CEO-board cooperation. Hence, 
board interlocks make an ideal setting to examine the impact of social ties on firm behaviour 
since the board itself makes the corporate decisions (Brown & Drake, 2014). 
 
Brown & Drake (2014) examines tax avoidance when using board interlocks to define which 
companies are affiliated. The study looks explicitly at low-tax ties: low-tax companies in the 
bottom quintile based on industry-adjusted, long-run cash-effective tax rates. They argue that 
board ties to low-tax firms with operational and strategic similarities with focal firms should 
affect tax avoidance at the focal firm to a greater extent because the information shared 
between the companies is more relevant. There are better opportunities for focal firms to 
absorb and use tax avoidance opportunities in their business. They find operationally and 
strategically similar network ties significantly impacting focal firms’ tax avoidance than 
dissimilar network ties. They use several different determinants on firm-level characteristics 
to define which companies are part of a peer group. 
 
2.5 Industries as peer group definition 
 
Another study examines companies mimicking product market leaders within the industry. It 
is an incentive for rival firms to mimic the product market leader’s firm’s performance, 
including tax avoidance, to remain competitive themselves (Kubick, Lynch, Mayberry, & 
Omer, 2015). 
 





Unlike the main emphasis of previous studies in tax avoidance, our study differs to the extent 
that we look at peer groups where the companies are most often unrelated and thus have 
independent firm-level characteristics. Because we use a common investor base as a 
determinant to examine the peer effect of tax avoidance and the fewer investors build their 
portfolio with companies with the same level of tax avoidance (“ex-ante” preferences), the 
companies have few other relationships. For example, like Cheng, Sun & Xie (2018), few 
peer groups are in the same industry. 5.74% of the companies in our database on average 
share the same 4-digit SIC, 8.21%, 11.62%, and 19.83% for 3,2 of the firms share 3-digit, 2-
digit, and 1-digit SICs, respectively.  
 
Furthermore, as additional research, we investigate whether industry-level characteristics 
drive the results. We drop peer firms that share the same SIC as the focal firm. The reason for 
this is because, in contrast to Cheng, Sun & Xie (2018), we have a higher number of shared 
industry firms in our peer groups (see Table 1.2) and want to see if the results persist. 
 
2.7 How large shareholders might affect tax strategies 
 
A study by Cronqvist & Fahlenbrach (2009) examines how large shareholders affect 
corporate policies and firm performance. Among other things, they find that blockholders 
significantly influence investment, financial, and executive compensation policies. It indicates 
that blockholders have varying preferences, investments, and governance styles. Hence, the 
study shows that blockholders are also an important piece that affects firm performance 
differences. When it turns out that large institutional blockholders influence corporate 
behavior by influencing firm’s decision-making, it will mean that these investors also have a 
golden opportunity to share their mindsets and preferences with the management of the 
companies (Cheng, Sun, & Xie, 2018). With this background in mind, our study uses the 
critical assumption that investors can influence the management of focal firms regarding tax 
avoidance policies. Thus, it is assumed that companies learn tax avoidance policies from other 
companies with the same investor base through, for example, social learning mechanisms. 
This mechanism is described by Cheng, Sun & Xie (2018) as investors “vote with their voice” 
Another possible mechanism may be that the firm’s management itself tries to satisfy the 
blockholders. Therefore, the management might examine the blockholders’ preferences by 
looking to peer firms which is a part of the blockholders’ portfolio. This mechanism is 
described by Cheng, Sun & Xie (2018) as investors “vote with their feet”. The effect simply 
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comes from the fact that investors are present and have an exit opportunity. Both mechanisms 
lead to companies learning from their peer firms when it comes to tax avoidance policies. 
Furthermore, Bird & Karolyi (2017) cf. Bird & Karolyi (2018) examines the effect of 
institutional ownership on tax avoidance. They find evidence that positive shocks to 
institutional ownership around Russell index reconstitutions lead to decreased effective tax 
rates. In addition, institutional ownership leads to reductions in ETR for companies with high 
ETR, while the effect is the opposite for low-ETR firms. This fact means that institutional 
owners contribute to pushing companies towards a common level of tax avoidance. 
Concerning our analysis, which we will return to later in the thesis, we include institutional 
ownership in percent as a control variable. 
 
2.8 The role of industries in tax planning 
 
Heitzman & Ogneva (2019) finds evidence that equity returns increase with the propensity for 
tax planning in a firm’s industry. They developed a hypothesis that asks whether investors 
require compensation to invest in firms that compete in industries characterized by greater tax 
planning intensity. They approach the problem based on critical assertions that the firm’s tax 
planning is heavily influenced by its industry, leading to investors expecting firms in 
industries with ample tax planning opportunities to adopt similar future tax strategies. 
Furthermore, an intensive tax-planning industry will increase the expectation of the firm’s 
future exposure to non-diversifiable risk.  
 
There is abundant evidence that industry plays a central role in the tax planning environment. 
For instance, at the legislative level, the Treasury’s annual Tax Expenditures reports in detail 
“revenue losses attributable.” The industry characteristics question whether there is an 
interaction between industry and firm tax planning beyond externalities. We all expect that 
firms operating in the industry with high scrutiny from the tax authority will have lower net 
cash flows from its tax planning, reducing the cost of capital benefit suggested by Shevlin, 
Lim, Lee & Goh (2016). In addition, high scrutiny drives the systematic risk of tax planning 
upwards if the tax authority resists a particular method or instrument of tax planning increases 
the correlation of the firm’s cash tax savings with those other firms. There is a robust 
anecdotal and empirical support for the centrality of industry in firms’ tax planning decisions 






III. Hypothesis development 
Hanlon & Heitzman (2010) asks for more research on tax avoidance while using ownership 
structure as a determinant. While a stream of literature uses ownership structure as a 
determinant for tax avoidance research (Chen, Chen, Cheng, & Shevlin, 2010; Cheng, Huang, 
Li, & Stanfield, 2012; Khurana & Moser, 2013), only Cheng, Sun & Xie (2018) have 
examined the importance of a common institutional investor base. They find that common 
institutional investors have an impact on corporate tax avoidance.  
 
Furthermore, Cheng, Sun & Xie (2018) argues for two distinct ways in which common 
institutional blockholders could influence the firm’s management regarding tax avoidance. 
 
Firstly, institutional investors could vote with "their feet" by selling their shares when they are 
dissatisfied with corporate performance (Parrino, Sias, & Starks, 2003). Thus, the firm’s 
management could be encouraged to look towards other firm’s owned by the same 
blockholders and adjust their tax avoidance strategies in line with these peer firms. This 
means CIB’s have an indirect influence on firm’s tax avoidance. 
 
Secondly, there is also the possibility that institutional investors have a direct influence on 
corporate behaviour, thus "voting with voice." However, the literature is mixed regarding 
which institutional investors influence corporate decisions (Chen, Harford, & Li, 2007). Some 
institutional investors do indeed influence corporate behaviour while others do not. 
 
However, Admati, Pfleiderer & Zechner (1994) argue that monitoring by large shareholders 
allows the shareholder to influence the firms following their interest through negotiation with 
management, proxy fights, and involvement in choosing members of the board. This means 
CIB’s have a direct influence on firm’s tax avoidance by pressuring management. 
 
Since institutional investors have their preferences for tax avoidance, they are likely to serve 
as a bridge to facilitate the diffusion of tax avoidance information across firms in their 
portfolios (Cheng, Sun, & Xie, 2018). 
 
Furthermore, Edmans (2009) argue that blockholders can impact governance either by "voting 
with voice" or "voting with feet." Thus, both mechanisms could have an impact on a firm's tax 
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avoidance, and we do not distinguish between these two mechanisms for our main research 
question. 
 
This leads us to our main hypothesis: 
 
H.1: Firms engage in similar levels of tax avoidance if they are owned by common 
institutional blockholders. 
 
One question is when tax avoidance mimicking occurs. Is it the case that the companies 
continue to mimic tax avoidance to their CIB connected peer firms long after an investor has 
become a blockholder (ie owned 5% of shares outstanding), or is it the case that the 
mimicking is greatest in the first years, and gradually decreases? 
 
Other studies in tax avoidance (Baskaran, 2015; Lopes da Fonseca, 2017) find that declining 
tax mimicking is the case. We want to investigate whether this can also apply in our 
institutional setting where we look at U.S. firms connected by CIB’s. 
 
Furthermore, Cheng, Sun & Xie (2018) argue that blockholders with long-term horizons 
should have a greater influence on corporate behaviour because of a more stable influence. 
Thus, long-term blockholder are more likely to get involved in decision making. They study 
the peer relation, where long-term relation is defined as peer connected by CIB’s for more 
than one year in the five years. 
 
In our analysis, we differ from this approach. We study the effect by how long the 
blockholder have been a blockholder in the firms and not the relation itself.  
 
We also predict a portfolio weighting difference between short-term blockholders and long-
term blockholders. Short-term blockholders have more recently bought shares, thus 
surpassing the 5% of shares outstanding mark. This does not mean long-term blockholders 
cannot trade shares while still being above the 5% of shares outstanding mark. Regardless, we 
expect more portfolio weight changes for blockholders classified as short-term. 
 
We conduct two different analysis which is distinct in the following way. Firstly, we examine 





calculate peer ETR based on focal firms short-term blockholders other portfolio firms. Then 
we do the same for long-term blockholders in the focal firms. In this analysis it does not 
matter whether the blockholder is classified as short-term or long-term in the peer firms. 
Thus, we want to see whether the classification in the focal firms matter. 
 
Secondly, we conduct another analysis. However, this time around we do not examine the 
classification at the focal firms. Instead, we examine whether the focal firms react upon peer 
firms ETR’s based upon the CIB’s are classified as a long-term blockholder or short-term 
blockholder in the peer firms. Thus, we want to see whether the classification in peer firms 
matter. 
 
With how the portfolio weighing is calculated in mind (see chapter 6.3), and the findings from 
Baskaran (2015) and Lopes da Fonseca (2017) we develop two supplementary hypotheses: 
 
H.2.1: Tax avoidance mimicking towards peer firms are stronger when peer firms are 
connected by short-term blockholders in the focal firms. 
 
H.2.2: Tax avoidance mimicking towards peer firms are stronger when the connected 
blockholders are short-term blockholders in the peer firms. 
 
IV. Introduction to our model 
4.1 Panel data  
 
The variable 𝛼𝑖 captures all unobserved, time-constant factors that affect yit . ai is called the 
unobserved effect. 𝛼𝑖 is often referred to as unobserved heterogeneity (or individual 
heterogeneity). In our models, individual heterogeneity refers mainly to firm heterogeneity, 
industry heterogeneity, and year heterogeneity. The error ui is often called idiosyncratic error 
or time-varying error because it represents unobserved factors that change over time and 
affect yit. These are very much like the errors in a straight time series regression equation. A 
simplification of our models is:  
 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅_𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 
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With t = 1, 2, 3….and so on   
Since i denotes different firms, we call 𝛼𝑖 an unobserved firm effect: it represents all factors 
that can affect the focal firm tax rate, which does not change over time. We have included 
firm characteristics in 𝛼𝑖. However, as explained earlier, fixed effects remove some relevant 
variation since we want to capture strategic reaction, which is constant over time (i.e., 
inherent managerial characteristics). Hence, we focus on industry fixed effects and not firm-
fixed effects in most of our analysis. 
4.2 Fixed Effects with Unbalanced Panel 
 
Our database contains missing years on individual firms since their shareholding information 
and change from year to year. Investment time length also varies. This results from the fact 
that some firms do not have CIBs across all years in the sample. More importantly, is the fact 
that firms’ effective tax rate also needs to be in the 0 to 100% range even to be considered in 
the peer effective tax rate calculation, and this varies across years.  
 
Some investors hold shares in a shorter window, while others hold a more extended time 
period, which makes t variates. Another common scenario is when an investor liquidates his 
shares in one firm, making his ownership leaves the sample, so-called attrition. A problem 
arises when attrition is correlated with the idiosyncratic error – those observed factors that 
change over time and affect effective tax rate – then the resulting sample section problem can 
cause biased estimators (Baltagi, Song, & Koh, 2003). We also have a non-random sample in 
subsequent periods. However, we are aware of these inherent characteristics of our data set, 
and this limitation is considered in our model.  
 
Provided that some i is not correlated with the characteristic errors, uit , an incomplete panel 
data withhold. Even so, our model with firm fixed effects does allow attrition to be correlated 
with ai, the unobserved effect. It aligns with the idea of allowing some units to be dropped out 
of the initial sampling, and ai captures this. We also conduct fixed firm effects analysis to 
control for unobserved factors that can affect the focal’s firm effective tax rate and be 
correlated with the fraction (Wooldridge, 2012) as a robustness test and in event studies.  
 






Manski C. F. (1993) sheds light on an econometric challenge that makes it difficult to isolate 
the effect of the company’s response to peer companies’ tax planning strategies. Armstrong, 
Glaeser & Kepler (2019) points out the problem in a corporate tax planning setting and argue 
that the reflection problem comes from the fact that peer companies, specifical companies in 
the same industry, often have the same background characteristics and equal firm-level 
characteristics. This problem affects both companies' tax planning.  
 
In our analyses in section 10.3, we only look at peer companies with different SIC codes in 
relation to the focal firm. In this way, we remove, to some extent, the problem within 
companies in the same industry that often have the same firm-level characteristics. We then 
see if focal firms follow their peer firms’ tax planning strategies, where focal firms and peer 
firms are not within a common industry.  
 
Manski C. F. (1993) illustrates “the reflection problem” by a trivial example. His model 
explains that the problem arises when a researcher observes the distribution of the behaviour 
in a group and tries to deduce whether the average behaviour in group A affects group B, 
where group A and B are the two subsets of the entire population. Imagine an analogy to 
reflection from looking in a mirror when you see someone make a hand movement. Without 
understanding what is going on, it becomes difficult to say whether the reflection in a mirror 
when you see someone makes a hand movement. Without knowing what is going on, it 
becomes difficult to say whether the reflection in the mirror affects the hand movement or 
whether it is the movement that affects the reflection in the mirror. To put it bluntly, an 
animal will not necessarily understand whether it reflects the mirror or the hand movement 
which is a triggering factor.  
 
Hence, we use a lead-lag model in our analyses instead of seeing how focal firms follow their 
peers in the same year. In addition to the problem, new tax rules can affect both focal firms 
and peer firms in the same year.  
 
Manski C. F. (1993) examines the reflection problem in linear models and categorizes three 
different determinants that affect the analysis result.  
 
1. Firstly, we have endogenous effects, where an individual’s propensity to behave in a 




2. Secondly, we have exogenous effects. An individual tendency to behave in a given 
way stems from the fact that individuals have the same individual or institutional 
characteristics as groups do.  
 
3. Thirdly, we have correlated effects, where an individual firm’s tendency to behave in a 
given way varies depending on the exogenous characteristics of the group.  
 
Armstrong, Glaeser & Kepler (2019) describes these problems in its specific corporate tax 
planning setting, where peer firms are defined as firms in the same industry. Exogenous 
effects (2) can be caused by firms operating in the same industry being exposed to the same 
levels of tax planning due to the industry’s environment. For example, companies within the 
same industry have the same opportunities for tax planning due to industry-specific tax rules, 
and these companies have to adapt to new tax strategies due to equal competitiveness in the 
peer group to survive. Our model with specifications ranging from 4-digit SIC code to 2-digit 
tries to solve this problem.  
 
As for correlated effects (3), firms in the same industry may face the same level of tax 
planning because the firm-level characteristics of the firms are correlated. It can be similar 
risk profiles and capital structures for companies in the same industry. It is also a problem 
with the way we define peer firms. It is conceivable that investors choose companies for their 
portfolios with similar risk profiles and other firm-level characteristics.  
 
Armstrong, Glaeser & Kepler (2019) describes the endogenous effects (1) as "outcome-on-
outcome"" effects. The effects are beyond what is captured by the (2) exogenous and (3) 
correlated effect components. This direct effect represents how a company responds directly 
to a strategic tax change within their peer firms. We can interpret this effect component as a 
direct “strategic reaction.”  
 
One possible problem is that it is not easy to separate and isolate the effects from (1), (2), and 
(3), respectively. And in that case, we have an identification problem. Firstly, we have an 
endogeneity problem with possible omitted correlated effects (3). In our analysis, this 
problem may be due to investors building their portfolios with companies with the same firm-





endogeneity problem, making it challenging to separate direct strategic direction from (1) and 
(2). Even if one does not omit correlated products due to the simultaneous nature of strategic 
reaction (Armstrong, Glaeser, & Kepler, 2019). Focal firm number 1 responds to its peers. 
Still, this firm can also be a peer firm for another company; in this case, focal firm number 2 
(where focal firm 1 is the peer company of focal firm two and vice versa), resulting in 
collinearity. We have a 11,1% (7,5%) correlation between focal GAAP ETR (focal cash ETR) 
in year t and peer GAAP ETR (peer cash ETR) in year t-1 (see correlation plots in section 
8.4). 
 
To solve this endogeneity problem, we introduce a tax avoidance shock event for the peer 
companies, exogenous for the focal firm. Section 10.3 shows the results of the event study 
model.  
 
4.4 Caveat: firm fixed effects 
 
Armstrong, Glaeser & Kepler (2019) argues that strategic reaction contains a cross-sectional 
component that only varies among companies but is, on the other hand, fixed over time. When 
using firm fixed effects, we will remove some of the relevant variation required by answering 
the central question: Do firms engage in similar levels of tax avoidance if the same investors 
own them? Thus, when using firm fixed effects, we do not capture all relevant variation. 
 
Within transformation removes all time-invariant variation. However, strategic reactions are 
captured in such variance, and we do have the problem with applying firm fixed effects. Some 
of the variety we are looking for disappears. Hence, we follow previous studies in the field 
and focus on regressions with industry fixed effects to remove variation between industries 
instead of between companies (Cheng, Sun, & Xie, 2018). More specifically, we use a 2-digit 
SIC as a basis for industry fixed effects. This approach allows us to control for unobservable 
heterogeneity between industrial groups while at the same time maintaining most of the 
relevant variation between companies.  
 
In addition to the concern that fixed effects fail to understand the cross-sectional variation of 
strategic reaction, Leary & Roberts (2014) also mention that fixed effects should be used 




We still show that our results are robust to firm fixed effects and the use of this does not affect 
our baseline regression by a lot. 
 
V. Definition of variables 
 
5.1 Dependent variable  
 
In this section we introduce the measures of tax avoidance. 
 
One measurement used in this paper to calculate tax avoidance is the effective tax rate (ETR). 
Effective tax rate calculation is a valuable metric for benchmarking the tax paid between two 
or more entities. Companies pay tax on their gross income, and after-tax deductions sit firms 
with net income. In addition, investors actively use an effective tax rate as a profitability 
indicator of a company. Hence, we include ETR in COMPUSTAT actively in our model to 
determine the level of tax avoidance and decision to choose investments by investors. 
We annual GAAP effective tax rate as a measure of tax avoidance. We follow the formula 







Furthermore, we also use cash effective tax rate as another measure of tax avoidance. We 
follow the cash ETR formula given by De Simone, Nickerson, Seidman & Stomberg (2020): 
 






5.2 Independent variable 
 
In this section we introduce the independent variable of interest, namely the peer ETR’s. 
 
According to Cheng, Sun & Xie (2018), a novel channel of tax avoidance diffusion is 
measured by connections between firms sharing common institutional blockholders (CIBs). 
We define firms as peer firms when at least one institutional blockholder (which owns a 






A blockholder is described as the owner of a significant block of a firm shares and bonds who 
can influence the company with their voting rights. Hence, our peer ETR is based upon firms 
connected through CIBs. 
 
As for the calculation of peer ETR, firstly, peer firms are identified through common 
institutional blockholders with focal firms. Then we calculate a portfolio weighted ETR based 
on all the peer firms, excluding the focal firms. This is done iteratively. Consider firm A, B, 
and C as a peer group defined by one shared CIB. Peer ETR for firm A is calculated as the 
ETR of firm B and C. Thus, firm B and C is the portfolio excluding firm A, the focal firm. 
 
In the next iteration, firm B is considered as the focal firm, and firm A and C represents the 
portfolio excluding firm B. Hence, peer ETR for firm B is calculated based upon firm A and 
C’s ETR while weighting those two ETRs by the respective market capitalization ratio 
between firm A and C. 
 
In all tables using cash (GAAP) ETR as a dependent variable, peer ETR is calculated based 
upon cash (GAAP) ETR. 
 
See the chapter 6.3 for a trivial example of the peer ETR calculation. 
 
 
5.3 Control variables 
  
Our selection of independent variables are consistent with the existing literature (Cheng, Sun, 
& Xie, 2018).We control for intangible assets (INTAN), institutional investors (INST), 
leverage ratio (LEV), market-to-book value (MB), loss carryforward (NOL), change in loss 
carryforward (DIFFNOL),  net plant, property and equipment (PPE), profitability (ROA), 
logarithm of total market capitalization (LOG_MKTCAP), foreign income and loss (FIN_C), 
equity income in earnings, deflated by lagged total assets (EQUINC), research and 
development (R&D), industry-average research and development (R&D_Blank), Herfindahl-
Hirshman Index (HHI). 
 




𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 (𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁) =  




It is traditionally challenging to evaluate the actual value of intangible assets since all 
expenses of creating intangible assets by companies cannot account for on the balance sheet, 
but only possible if the firm acquires these types of assets from others. Usually, the purchase 
price is much higher than the recorded book value of intangible assets, presenting the 
premium for goodwill. Neubig & Wunsch-Vincent (2018) examines a typical method for 
profit shifting among firms is the strategic location of intangibles. They find profit shifting is 
higher for entities with significant intangible assets because mispricing is more accessible and 
influential. Karkinsky & Riedel (2012) show low tax rates increase the profitability that a firm 
applies for a patent in a low-tax rate location. Beer & Loeprick (2015) support the hypothesis 
that profit-shifting responsiveness is higher for subsidiaries with higher ratios of intangible 
assets to total assets.  
 
5.3.2 Research and Development (R&D) 
 
𝑅_𝐷 =  
𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑐ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 (𝑋𝑅𝐷)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 (𝐴𝑇) 
 
 
Firms’ R&D expenditure tax deductibles and historically generate further tax credits. Mangers 
are motivated to classify corporate expense as R&D to reduce tax liabilities. This complex tax 
practice is labelled as “strategic R&D classification,” thus places limitations on regulating 
firms’ use of R&D tax credits. R&D tax credits create a permanent difference between a book 
and taxable income, resulting in a corresponding decrease in tax expense on the income 
statement (Laplante, Skaife, Swenson, & Wangerin, 2019). Many studies found high levels of 
responsiveness to profit shifting, particularly for R&D-intensive companies (Neubig & 
Wunsch-Vincent, 2018). 
 
5.3.3 Missing Research and Development  
 
We constructed a dummy variable for dealing with missing R&D observations. We combine 
the use of dummy variable for missing R&D with replacing missing values with the industry 





5.3.4 Firm size (MKTCap/LogMktcap) 
 
𝑀𝑘𝑡𝑐𝑎𝑝 = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 − 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙
− 𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙(𝑃𝑅𝐶𝐶_𝐹) 𝑥 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝐶𝑆𝐻𝑂) 1 
 
There is an absence of scale and complexity in small firms than large firms. Smaller firms 
have less diversified tax strategies and are more exposed to changes in tax practices. Unlike 
their larger counterparts, they are less willing to invest in political influence to protect their 
strategies. Hence, they are more exposed to tax policy changes. Contrarily, large multinational 
firms have more incentives and conduct more efforts to shift income, namely shifting income 
through an alternation of transfer price assigned to international trade with affiliates 
(Clausing, 2009). 
 
5.3.5 Value and stock return MB (Market-to-book value) 
  
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 (𝑀𝐵)
=
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 − 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 −  𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 (𝑃𝑅𝐶𝐶_𝐹) 𝑥 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (𝐶𝑆𝐻𝑂)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛/𝑂𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐶𝐸𝑄)
 
 
5.3.6 Leverage ratio (LEV) 
 




Debt Tax Shield = Tax Rate * Interest Rate * Debt  
 
Even though leverage ratio has not always been included with other measures in proxies for 
tax planning, its relevance as a measurement of tax planning is indisputable. Debt gives 
access to interest tax deduction valuable to the firms (Kaplan & Strömberg, 2009). By 
utilizing the Leverage Ratio as a proxy for tax planning, we try to capture how firms create 
value by generating debt tax shields. Debt tax shields are known as reducing income taxes 
that result from taking an allowable deduction from taxable income. The American tax system 
 
1 We use the natural logarithm of Mktcap as our firm size control variable.  
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favours debt over equity, as firms do not get tax deductions on dividends and thus not on 
equity. The strategy explains the incentives for firms to lever up to generate interest tax 
deductions (Roald & Roti, 2015). 
 
5.3.7 Profitability measured by return on assets (ROA) 
 





Return on assets (ROA) is usually used as a benchmark to analyse how a company’s 
management efficiently uses its assets to generate earnings. The higher the ROA, the better. 
High profitability also means higher tax to be paid. Total assets imply company sizes, where 
the company size has also been used to indicate tax avoidance (Kartikaningdyah, 2019). 
Gunaasih (2021) confirms that profitability has a positive effect on tax avoidance through 
empirical research.  
 
5.3.8 Loss Carryforward (NOL) 
 
A loss carryforward is an accounting technique used to reduce the total amount of tax the 
company owes the government by applying the current year’s net operating loss to the future 
year’s net income. Suppose a company experiences a negative net operating income (NOI) in 
year one but positive NOI in subsequent years. In that case, it can reduce the firm’s future 
profits using the NOL carryforward to record some or all the losses from the first year in the 
following years. This method is used to spread a current net operating loss over subsequent 
years’ NOI. Subsequently, NOL carryforwards are recorded as assets on the company’s 
balance sheet. It gives the company an economic advantage in future tax liability tax savings 
and is especially valuable during an economic downturn. Streitferdt (2013) prove firms with 
tax loss carryforward have a higher value than comparable companies without unused tax 
credits. Loss carryforwards can impact firm value significantly (Betker, 1995). As a result of a 
direct relationship between the amount of fewer carryforwards and the amount of tax paid, 
NOL is included. 
 





We observe change in loss carryforward in firms by setting ∆𝑁𝑂𝐿 = 𝑁𝑂𝐿 t – NOLt-1 . If the 
change is positive, ∆𝑁𝑂𝐿  will have a dummy variable equal to 1 or otherwise equal to 0.  
5.3.10 Net Plan, Property and Equipment (PPE) 
 
𝑃𝑃𝐸 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦, 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑇) 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 (𝑇𝐴) 
 
 
5.3.11 Institutional ownership percentage (Inst) 
 
Leipälä (2017) finds a shred of slight evidence that supports the hypothesis that firms with 
more institutional investors exhibit higher levels of nonconforming tax avoidance. A small 
association between institutional ownership and conforming tax avoidance is also confirmed. 
There is a positive association between institutional investors and corporate tax avoidance 
since they bring tax planning knowledge to make firms’ tax planning more effective (Chen, 
Huang, Li, & Shevlin, 2019; Khan, Srinivasan, & Tan, 2017). On the other hand, a study 
proposed by Grossman & Hart (1980) concludes that institutional investors value short-term 
over long-term, which primarily may lead to higher tax avoidance. But this effect is 
contradicted by the free-rider problem that firms with multiple institutional blockholders 
have, which may lead to lower tax avoidance.  
 
5.3.12 Foreign income or loss (F_INC) 
 




International affiliates with foreign operations arguably have more tax planning opportunities 
through shifting their income to foreign subsidiaries than purely domestic firms. Payoffs from 
tax strategies are more exposed to changes in currency exchange rates, foreign tax policies, 
trade policies, and among other things. Multinationals are also less exposed to domestic tax 
policies if they operate in multiple countries, which leads to possibly higher or lower than the 
tax rate if they had operated purely in the U.S.  
 









Equity income is referred to income from stock dividends. Investors are rewarded for earning 
shares in a company. Dividend-paying companies can be large, well-established companies 
with mature revenue and earnings. Most of them have a well-established scheme for targeted 
annual dividend pay-out rates. Paying dividends usually sends a clear, powerful message 
about a company’s performance, showing a solid demonstration of financial strength.  
Nonetheless, many quickly expanding U.S. technology tech firms refuse to pay dividends 
since they use their withhold cashback into operations during pivotal growth stages. The 
reasons could be that not paying dividends may be more beneficial to investors from a tax 
perspective. Karjalainen, Kasanen, Kinnunen & Niskanen (2020) examine tax considerations 
as determinants of dividends decisions and earnings management. There is a strong link 
between firms’ taxes and reported net earnings in most European countries.  
 
5.3.14 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
 





where H 𝜖 ( 1
𝑁






𝐻 < 0.01 (𝑜𝑟 100) 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
𝐻 <  0.25 (𝑜𝑟 1 500) 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦
0.15 <  𝐻 <  0.25 (𝑜𝑟 1 500 𝑡𝑜 2 500) 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐻 >  0.25 (𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 2 500) 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛2
 
 
The term Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is an acclaimed measure used widely in competition 
law to gauge the market concentration of specific industries. It measures the size of firms and 
indicates competition among them. It is defined as the sum of squares of firms’ market shares 
 









VI. Data processing 
6.1 Data sources  
 
6.1.1 Data source: Common ownership data 
 
 
We use “Common Ownership Data” by Michael Sinkinson. 
 
The data set contains investors and holding information of the S&P 500 index firms from 
1999 to 2017, which 1999 marks the beginning year of compulsory electronic information 
filing. Although this data set has some improvements from Thomson Reuter’s known 
limitations, there is no guarantee that the data set is flawless, since the source itself can 
contain incomplete and wrong information.  
 
There have been found a number of issues with the Thomas Reuters (TR) “S34” used by 
many researchers in their studies about the common ownership hypothesis, specifically a lack 
of records of Blackrock Holdings and discrepancies when accessing data for constituent firms 
of the S&P 500 Index. The new dataset is set out separately of 13(f) holdings from the source 
documents, are all public and available electronically from the Securities and Exchange 
Commissions (SEC) websites. Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) has worked 
extensively to improve the database. They first gathered all 13(f) fillings from 1999-2017, the 
corpus is over 318,000 filling and occupies ~25GB of space if unzipped. Firms of interest is 
holdings of all public firms with a market capitalization of at least $10M. They extracted the 
filling date, reporting date, and reporting entity (Central Index Key, or CIK, and CIKNAME) 
from the header of the file. The approach is they look for any lines that contains a CUSIP 
code that they were interested in, and then they attempt to determine the “number of shares” 
field and the “value” field. With the help of the downloaded stock price data form CRSP, the 
filling date and value (price*share) can be validated. Any derivative holdings descripting by 
phrases such as OPT, CALL, PUT, WARR are removed from the data. The final resulting 
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dataset has around 48M reported holdings (CIK-CUSIP) for all 76 quarters and between 4,000 
and 7,000 CUSIPs with between 1,000 and 4,000 investors per quarter. The fields are3:  
• CIK: the central index key assigned by the SEC for this investor 
• CUSIP: the identity of the holdings  
• Shares: the number of shares reportedly held.  
• Rdate: reporting date (end of quarter). 8 digit, YYYYMMDD 
• Fdate: filling date. 8 digit, YYYYMMDD 
• Ftype: the form name 
 
They did not consolidate separate or possibly related Black Rock entities. They also dropped 
any CUSIP-rdate observation where any investor in that CUSIP reports owning greater than 
50% of shares outstanding, or the one where greater than 120% of shares outstanding are 
reported to be held by 13(f) investors.  
 
There are also profit weight values (i.e. \kappa) for all firms in the sample. The fields are:  
• CUSIP_FROM: beginning date of the holding 
• CUSIP_TO: ending date of the holding 
• KAPPA: profit weight values of the holding  
• Quarter: quarter identification of the holding 
 
6.1.2 Data source: CRSP/Compustat merged 
 
W use the CRSP/Compustat merged database to extract the financial data. All our variables 
originate from the CRSP/Compustat merged fundamental annual database with two 
exceptions. Firstly, for identifying a blockholder, defined as an institutional investor who 
holds at least 5% of the current shares outstanding in at least one quarter within a specific 
year, we use the CRSP/Compustat merged fundamental quarterly database. Secondly, when 
calculating institutional ownership percentage as a control variable, we also make use of the 
quarterly current shares outstanding variable (cshoq) from the CRSP/Compustat merged 








The databases are available at the website of Wharton university of Pennsylvania 4.  
 
6.1.3 Processing shares in the common ownership data 
 
We begin with the Common Ownership data set which comprises of three variables:  
 
• CIK: unique code for each unique investor 
• CUSIP: shareholding information for each unique firm 
• Rdate: shareholding reporting date 
• Shares 
 
The data set is comprised of quarter data since shareholding registration must be conducted 
quarterly, however, the Compustat/CRSP merged fundamentals quarterly did not contain 
variables to calculate all our control variables. Therefore, we decided to eliminate quarter data 
and retain annual data within the Common Ownership data and merge this with the 
Compustat/CRSP merged fundamentals annual database. We then group the data after each 
investor, shareholding and registration date. Consequently, we calculate the number of shares 
each investor holds as the summation of quarterly registered shares within each year and 
divide this by four. Thus, this calculation of shares from quarterly values to annual values is 
used in the portfolio weighting together with annual CRSP/Compustat data. 
 
6.2 Merging the datasets 
In order to manage to merge “Common Ownership” data set with COMPUSTAT/CRSP-
merged data, we make a change for the CUSIP variable. CUSIP-variable in the Common 
Ownership data set has a string of 8 characters, while it has a string of 9 characters in the 
COMPUSTAT data set. The ninth digit in COMPUSTAT data is an automatically generated 
control digit to avoid mistakes in creating CUSIPs. We, therefore, choose to exclude this last 
digit, which makes the CUSIP-variable from the two data sets comparable for matching. This 
approach created a few duplicates in which multiple CUSIPs had different 9-digit strings but 







Furthermore, we exclude firms from regulated and financial industries (those with SIC codes 
between 4900:4999 and 6000:6999). 
 
A very crucial point we have considered in our analysis is the urge to differentiate between 
fiscal year and calendar year. Fiscal year is based upon which calendar year most of the fiscal 
months are within. 
 
If the variable fyr (Fiscal year-end Month) is equal to or exceeds 6, then the calendar year and 
fiscal year will be the same. Otherwise, we add one year to the financial year, so that calendar 
and fiscal year coincide.  
 
Figure 1.1: Coinciding fiscal year and calendar year 
Example when adding one year to the fiscal year: Most fiscal months are within 2004 and 
fiscal year is 2004. However, end of balance date is in the 2005 calendar year; thus, we do 
need to adjust. 
 
 
Source: own illustration 
 
Figure 1.2: Coinciding fiscal year and calendar year 
Example when not adding one year to the fiscal year: Most fiscal months are within 2005 and 
fiscal year is 2005. End of balance date is in the 2005 calendar year; thus, we do not need to 
adjust. 
 


















Source: own illustration 
 
6.3 The effective tax rates: 
 
After calculating the effective GAAP tax rate as total income taxes divided by pre-tax income, 
we filter out data with values larger than one and smaller than 0, hence GAAP ETR ∈ [0,1]. 
This approach is unlike De Simone, Nickerson, Seidman & Stomberg (2020) who winsorizes 
ETRs to 0 and 1. We also filter out firms with negative or zero pre-tax income. The same 
approach is used when calculating cash ETR, except we use income taxes paid as the 
numerator. 
 
Peer-effective tax rate (Peer_etr) is based on CIB information for each firm per calendar year; 
we observe whether specific blockholders are also blockholders of other firms. We aggregate 
each firm’s total market capitalization in the subset where the firm is excluded and then 
multiply with the firm’s ETR. After that, we calculate the specific blockholder’s total market 
capitalization in their portfolio, excluding the firm we are observing. Peer_ETR is weighted 
and summed up. 
 
Illustration: Considering firm A with the following subset 
 
Figure 2.1: Peer ETR calculation 
 
Investor (CIK)  Firm (CUSIP)  Number of 
shares 
PRCC ETR 












2005 2005 July (7) 2005
32 
 
1 A 100 10 0.3 
2 A 100 10 0.3 
3  A 100  10 0.3 
 
The table below illustrates the subset for investor one excluding firm A 
 
For CIB 1, can we observe all other firms which also have the same CIB. The illustration 
below shows how firm B’s, C’s, and D’s have CIB 1, and the tax rate is determined. Peer 
effective tax rate is weighted after each firm’s market capitalization on the whole investor’s 
portfolio total market capitalization, excluding firm A 
 























1 B 80  7 0.33 560 1955 0.2864 0.094526854 
1 C 90 6 0.34 540 1955 0.2762 0.093913043 
1 D 95 9 0.35 855 1955 0.4373 0.153060905 
      Sum Peer_ETR 0.341508951 
 
Figure 2.3: Peer ETR calculation 
 
CIK  CUSIP Shares PRCC ETR Peer_ETR 
(no average) 
1 A 100 10 0.3 0.3415 
2 A 100 10 0.3  
3 A 100 10 0.3  
 
The same procedure is done for CIB 2 and 3, and their inputs are enumerated in firm A in the 
same way. The final Peer_ETR for firm A is thence a weighted product of Peer_ETR from all 





respectively 0.3243 and 0.314,3, and they have an equal number of shares in firm A. We 
calculate the shares-weighted Peer_ETR accordingly for firm A. 
 
Figure 2.4: Peer ETR calculation 
 
CIK CUSIP Shares PRCC ETR Peer_ETR 
1 A 100 10 0.3 0.3415 * (100/300) 
2 A 100 10 0.3 0.3243 * (100/300) 
3 A 100  10 0.3 0.3143 * (100/300) 
  =300 Sum Peer_ETR 0.3267 
 
 
The result for firm A is amounted to Peer_ETR of 0.3267 in one particular year. 
Figure 2.5: (Peer ETR calculation) 
 
CUSIP ETR Peer_ETR 
A 0.3 0.3267 
 
Parallel computing packages in R made this for-loop possible in a reasonable amount of run-
time. The concept of parallel computing is to carry out many calculations simultaneously and 
improve calculating capacity (Schmidberger, et al., 2009). 
 
6.4 Handling of missing values 
 
For all details about missing values handling, see appendix C. 
 
6.4.1 Missing R&D 
 
Koh & Reeb (2015) shows a perusal of subsample of 3000+ NYSE-listed firms in their 
samples shows that a substantial number fail to provide any information regarding their R&D 
efforts. This accounts for 57.9% of firms who fail to provide any information regarding their 




In the study by Koh & Reeb (2015), corporate R&D disclosure decision is investigated to be 
affected influentially by managers’ nature discretion decision. Their study encounters non-
reporting R&D firms file over 14 times as firms that report zero R&D expenditure, and more 
than 10% of COMPUSTAT firms display evidence of engaging in innovation and activities. 
Hence, indicating the interpreting missing R&D as zero R&D activities in firms can lead to 
substantive bias in our empirical test. In line with Koh and Reeb’s Monte Carlo simulations 
recommendation, we denote a blank dummy for missing R&Ds. Our panel data benefit from 
replacing missing R&D values with the average industry R&D and a dummy variable to 
denote missing values replaced by the industry average (Koh & Reeb, 2015).  
 
There is a total of about 8,000 missing R&D observations in our net samples, and these are 
replaced with the industry average R&D. Some industries do not have any firms with non-
missing R&D values, and as a result, some observations have not been replaced with the 
industry average and is set to 0, aligned with the approach posted by various studies in 
Strategic Management (Koh & Reeb, 2015). 
 
6.4.2  Other variables 
 
We also replace missing pretax income(foregin) with pretax income minus pretax 
income(domestic) (Dyreng & Lindsey, 2009). Missing intangible assets is set to 0 (Peters & 
Taylor, 2017). Rest is explained in appenix C. 
 
VII. Sample construction 
 
Our procedure begins with all listed firms in COMPUSTAT data for fiscal years from 1999 to 
through 2017 by WRDS. We set up some requirements for observations to avoid selection 
bias, for which we have the necessary data to compute our primary tax planning measures and 
control variables. Firms in the COMPUSTAT dataset have to be incorporated in the U.S. (fic 
= “USA”) from 1999 to 2017. This means excluding foreign corporations subject to the 
resident country with different tax laws than U.S. tax laws. We exclude firms in the utility 
industry (SIC: 4900-4999) and financial industry (SIC: 6000-6999). The utility sector is 
characterized by close customer-supplier relationships, enabling principal customers and 
dependent suppliers to affect a firm’s tax avoidance strategy (Cen, Maydew, Zhang, & Zuo, 





franchise tax and complicated regulations. Like Armstrong, Glaeser & Kepler (2019) and 
Dyreng, Hanlon, Maydew & Thornock (2017), we exclude firm-years with negative pretax 
income. We winsorize our control variable with 1st and 99th percentiles. We also set our 
dependent variable so that ETR’s lies in the unit interval between zero and one. We lag all 
firm-, year- and industry-level control variables by one year. Our final samples consist of 
about 23 thousand firm-year observations. 
 
Figure 3: Sample selection procedure 
 
 
 Number of observations 
(GAAP ETR procedure) 
Number of observations 
(Cash ETR procedure) 
Firm-year observations from 
CRSP/Compustat merged 
fundamentals annual from 1999 to 
2017 
118,260 118,260 
Excluding regulated and financial 
industries 
(SIC codes between 4900:4999 and 
6000:6999) 
(37,618) (37,618) 
Excluding Non-U.S. incorporated 
firms  
(13,644) (13,644) 
Excluding observations with negative 
pre-tax income / ETR’s not in 0-1 
range and peers not fulfilling those 
definitions / + calendar year 2017 5 
(43,395) (43,983) 
Firm-year observations in final 




VIII. Empirical Analysis 
 
8.1 Empirical analysis preface 
 
The empirical analysis is based upon the PLM package in R. As the panel data is unbalanced, 
basic data management tasks are still conceptually simple, but becomes more cumbersome 
and error prone. However, PLM handles this perfectly (Croissant & Millo, 2008). 
  
8.2 Summary statistics 
 
5 Since the ownership data provided by Michael Sinkinson only contains holding information for the first 3 
quarters in 2017, we decided to drop the 2017 calendar year from our sample for consistency reasons. 
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Table 1 represents descriptive statistics for key variables used in our analysis. The sample in 
panel A consists of a total of 23,603 firm-year observations from 1999 to 2016. The 
dependent variable is GAAP_ETR which is used to measure tax avoidance. At the same time, 
GAAP_ETR has a mean value of 0.349 and a standard deviation of 0.123. PEER_ETR has a 
slightly lower mean value of 0.321 compared to the mean value of GAAP_ETR. Nonetheless, 
PEER_ETR’s standard deviation is at a smaller value of 0.039, which means the data clusters 
around its mean.  
 
For the control variables, mb has the mean value of 3.101 with means a firm has on average, a 
market-to-book ratio of 3.101, with a high standard deviation of 4.331. A low ratio of less 
than one could indicate that the stock is undervalued, and a higher ratio than one could mean 
the stock is overvalued. The result implies that most firms’ stock in our sample is expensive, 
with a lower quartile of 1.415 and an upper quartile of 3.656. Total market capitalization 
(mktcap) has a mean value of 4.102 billion dollars. However, the median value is only 0.821 
billion dollars. The significant difference between the mean value and median value can be 
explained by the big standard deviation (9.980 billion dollars) across firms. Our sample 
consist of firms of all sizes, including small-cap (i.e. $245 million to $821 million), mid-cap 
(i.e. $821 million to $2.806 billion), and large-cap ($2.806 billion or more). A firm has on 
average a ratio of 0.18 in intangible assets to total assets and 0.249 in property, plant, and 
equipment to total assets. Firms from our sample have an average leverage ratio (lev) of 0.171 
and R&D (r_d) on total assets ratio of 0.049. HHI from our example indicates that firms 
operate in the market without much market concentration.  
 
Please note that the statistics shows values after winsorizing the control variables; INTAN, 
INST, MB, DIFFNOL, PPE, ROA, MKTCAP, F_INC, EQINC, LEV, and R_D, to the 1st and 
99th percentiles. Furthermore, all ETR’s are filtered to the unit interval between 0 and 1.  
 
We would like to remark that most firms in our sample have a very high concentration of 
institutional investors in their shareholder register, which on average 66.3%. Firms in the 
upper quantile have 86.6% of their investors as institutional investors, while institutional 
investors own around 48,3% of firms in the lower quantile. 
 
For the cash ETR sample in panel B, the results remain similar. However, there are some key 





(Income Taxes Paid) compared to txt (Income Taxes Total). Secondly the cash ETR have a 
lower mean value and a higher standard deviation. This also contributes to a lower mean and a 
higher standard deviation of the (cash) peer ETR. 
 
 
8.3 ETR Graphs 
 
This graph represents the yearly ETR averages across all firms in our net sample. The peer 
ETR’s are calculated as described in the earlier section. 
 
Graph 1: Yearly ETR averages 
 
Source: Own illustration  
 
 
The time-series graph represents the value of the four variables over the observed period from 
1999 to 2016. Cash tax rates generally have a lower value than GAAP ETR, and they are also 
more volatile. We can see there is a declining trend of tax rate over time, with a GAAP tax 
rate was about 0.35 in 1999 and reduced to around 0.3 in 2016. The cash tax rate of 0.26 
reduces from the rate of 0.28 in 1999. The plot demonstrates an exciting result that the yearly 
peer ETR rates highly correlate with the yearly firm’s ETR rates. It gives us high confidence 
that the peer ETR calculation is free from error, as there is a low correlation between the 
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dependent and independent variables on firm level, which we detailly examine in the 
correlation plots below.  
 





Source: Own illustration 
 
The box plot shows the distribution of our two explainable variables (GAAP ETR and Cash 
ETR) and two explanatory variables (GAAP Peer ETR and Cash Peer ETR) based on five 
number summaries: minimum, first quartile Q1, median, third quartile (Q3) and maximum 
values. GAAP ETR has a median value of around 0.35, and Cash ETR has a median value of 
approximately 0.25. Peer GAAP ETR has almost identical median value with GAAP ETR, 
which is a little bit lower than 0.35. Peer Cash ETR’s median value is almost identical with 
Cash ETR’s median value. Cash ETR has a wider distribution compared to other variables. 
Since we have already restricted the values to be between zero and 1, the minimum value 







8.4 Correlation plots 
 




Source: Own illustration 
 
The correlation plot represents correlations in the net sample, using GAAP ETR as the tax 
avoidance measure. GAAP ETR is in year t, and all control variables are lagged one year 
back. Thus, “_lag” means the variable is in year t-1. For variable descriptions, see Appendix 
A. 
 
The correlations are low overall. However, there are some instances how high correlations, 
especially between inst and log_mktcap. Thus, some effect from log_mktcapt may bias our 






Plot 2: Correlation matrix for the Cash ETR sample 
 
 
Source: Own illustration 
 
Cash ETR is in year t, and all control variables are lagged one year back. Thus, “_lag” means 
the variable is in year t-1. For variable descriptions, see Appendix A. 
 
Correlations for the cash ETR sample remain similar to the GAAP ETR sample. For specific 
differences in the number of observations and missing values handling between the two 
samples, see Appendix C. 
 





We estimate the following model to examine how peer firms connected through CIB’s affect 
tax avoidance at focal firms: 
 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  β0 + β1𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,t−1 + β2𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 + β3𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + β4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + β5𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1
+ β6𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + β7𝛥 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + β8𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + β9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ β10𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + β11𝐹_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + β12𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + β13𝑅_𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
+ β14𝑅_𝐷_𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + β15𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐹𝐸 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
Our baseline regression is given in table 2, panel A and B.  
 
We are left with 17,003 observations when using GAAP ETR as a tax avoidance measure 
(panel A) and 16,638 when using cash ETR as a tax avoidance measure (panel B). In column 
1, there is a simple OLS regression as a multicollinearity assurance. In column 2, we also 
include year-fixed effects. This removes the impact of variables that vary over time but 
constant between firms, such as macroeconomic conditions (Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, 2018). 
The last column (3) includes industry fixed effects using 2-digit SIC. With industry-fixed 
effects, unobservable heterogeneity that varies across industries is removed.  
 
The most exciting results are in columns (2) and (3). That is, column (2) retains more relevant 
variation as discussed earlier in the chapter about strategic reactions and time-constant 
variance at the expense of not including industry fixed effects. In later analysis, we only show 
tables with both industry fixed effects and yearly fixed effects. However, we do perform 
robustness tests and event studies with firm fixed effects. 
 
Panel A: GAAP ETR as tax avoidance measure 
 
We see that when peer ETR in year t-1 increases by one percentage point, focal firms follow 
by increasing their ETR by 0.187 percentage points in year t. The results are significant at the 
1% level and similar to the results by Cheng, Sun & Xie (2018), who used other tax avoidance 
measures. 
 
Furthermore, we do not find significant results regarding institutional ownership in % of 
common shares outstanding. A higher proportion of institutional ownership in the focal firm 
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should contribute to the focal firm's tax strategy. In other words, in isolation, a higher share of 
institutional ownership should have a positive/dampening effect on tax avoidance for focal 
firms. However, we want to emphasize that the inst coefficient was more similar with Cheng, 
Sun & Xie (2018) before excluding firms with negative pre-tax income, and the sample was 
larger. 
 
Panel B: Cash ETR as tax avoidance measure 
 
The effect by peer ETR remains significant and is higher than the results using GAAP ETR as 
a tax avoidance measure. The peer_etr coefficient is 0.197 when using industry fixed effects.   
This finding is weaker than what Cheng, Sun & Xie (2018) found in their robustness analysis 
in Table 9 Panel D, where they found that the effect was that one percentage point increase in 
peer ETR in year t-1 gave an increase in focal firm ETR in year t by 0.243 percentage points. 
However, we use a different approach when calculating Cash ETR since we do not subtract 
special items from pre-tax income. Furthermore, we differ from Cheng, Sun & Xie (2018) 
because we exclude observations with negative pre-tax income. 
 
Results from both panels support our H.1. 
 
8.6 Differences in the peer ETR effect: peer firms connected by long versus short-term 
blockholders 
 
In this analysis, we look at the difference between peer ETR for long-term and short-term 
blockholders and how they impact focal firms. We want to capture the difference between tax 
avoidance mimicking towards peer firms based upon how long the investors have been a 
blockholder in the focal firms.  
 
The calculation is done by considering investors who own at least 5% of current shares 
outstanding for at least 4 subsequent years. If an investor has been a blockholder for the last 3 
years and is also a blockholder in year 4, this blockholder will be classified as long-term in 
year 4. If the respective blockholder also owns at least 5% of the shares in year 5, the 
respective blockholder is still classified as long-term in year 5. This is how the count 
continues until the investor no longer owns 5% of the shares, and when this is the case, the 





reclassified as be reclassified as long-term in the respective firm-year observation. Thus, 
short-term is the residual classification. 
 
We want to point out that we decided to remove observations of the calendar years 1999, 
2000, and 2001. The reason behind this is that we do not know what kind of holdings the 
investors had in the years before 1999. In other words, 2002 is the first possible year an 
investor to be classified as a long-term blockholder. The years before 2002 are removed, so 
we do not wrongly classify short-term investors before 2002 who truly were long-term 
investors in 1999, 2000 and 2001, respectively.  
 
The reason behind the few firm-year observations is that firms need to have at least one long-
term blockholder and one short-term blockholder in the same year. We end up with relatively 
few observations. In total, we have 5.621 (5,593) observations when using GAAP ETR 
(CASH ETR) as tax avoidance measure.  This means that the power of generalization is 
somewhat weaker in this regression than our prior regressions. We use a lead-lag model in our 
analysis, since we are concerned with capturing how focal firm responds to peer firm within a 
1-year window.  
 
We implement the following regression model to investigate at the difference between the 
blockholders classification as short-term and long-term in the focal firms.  
 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  β0 + β1𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅 𝐸𝑇𝑅(𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔)𝑖,𝑡−1 + β2𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅 𝐸𝑇𝑅(𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡)𝑖,𝑡−1 + β3𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1
+ β4𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + β5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + β6𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + β7𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + β8𝛥 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1
+ β9𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + β10𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + β11𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + β12𝐹_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1
+ β13𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + β14𝑅_𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + β15𝑅_𝐷_𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + β16𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐹𝐸 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
From table 3 panel A, we see a small difference between long-term peer ETR and short-term 
peer ETR. The coefficient for long-term peer ETR is 0.085 but is significant only at the 10% 
level. Furthermore, the coefficient for short-term peer ETR is 0.076, and significant at the 5% 
level. Hence, when using GAAP ETR as tax avoidance measure, our H.2.1 is partially 




From panel B, we see a significant effect in terms of short-term peer ETR when using Cash 
ETR as measure of tax avoidance. The coefficient of peer_etr_long is not significant. 
Furthermore, peer_etr_short coefficient is 0.186 and significant at the 1% level. Focal firms 
follow the portfolio of short-term blockholders to a much greater extent than the long-term 
blockholders portfolio when it comes to Cash ETR. Thus, H.2.1 is supported as short-term 
blockholders should have an more impact on focal firm’s tax adjustment. 
 
There is still one caveat with these results in mind. Chen, Harford & Li (2007) argue that 
long-term institutions focus on monitoring and influencing rather than trading for profit, while 
investors with a short-term horizon are better at predicting short-term profits (Yan & Zhang, 
2009). Furthermore, our results indicate that firms do not try to deviate from their long-term 
blockholders other portfolio firms regarding cash ETR. This gives us some concern that the 
peer firms connected via short-term blockholders at the focal firms, which drives the effect, 
might be due to similar firm-level characteristics between the firms in the peer group due to 
“ex-ante” preferences. Indicating that short-term blockholders are better at predicting levels of 
tax avoidance when they build their portfolios.  
 
Yet, we argue there is a paradoxical mechanism if the investors build their portfolios based on 
“ex ante” preferences for tax avoidance. This mechanism speaks against the endogeneity 
problem. To illustrate this point, consider the following illustration: 
 
“Investor A buys into a firm and leaves 3 years later, while investor B buys into another firm 
and remains in that firm. Investor A represents a short-term investor, while investor B 
represents a long-term investor. Both build their portfolio based on “ex-ante” preferences 
regarding tax avoidance. If investor A is satisfied with the company’s tax avoidance policies 
according to its “ex-ante” preferences, there is less reasons to leave the firm for other 
investment opportunities, everything else being equal. Similarly, there is greater reason for 
investor B to relocate his holdings if the investor is very dissatisfied with the firm’s tax 
avoidance policies in accordance with his “ex-ante” preferences, all other things being 
equal.”  
 
Thus, if investors build their portfolio based on their “ex-ante” preferences regarding tax 
avoidance, there is less reason to believe that Peer_etr_portfolio_short (and a greater reason 






However, we look further into the endogeneity problem in our event studies below. 
 
8.7 Differences in the peer ETR effect: peer firms with long versus short-term 
blockholders 
 
We want to examine whether there is any difference between the blockholders portfolio in 
terms of short-term and long-term holdings. To investigate this further, we use the same 
method to separate blockholders into short-term and long-term. Unlike other previous 
analysis, we look at two different groups of portfolios for the same individual blockholders. 
We spilt their portfolio into different groups. We have a sub-portfolio where the blockholders 
short-term holdings are included, while the other sub-portfolio contains the blockholders 
long-term holdings. 
 
Thus, we want to see whether the blockholders long/short-term classification in peer firms 
matter regarding tax avoidance mimicking. 
 
A long-term blockholder is still defined as an institutional investor which have been a 
blockholder in the same firm for at least in 4 subsequent years, and short-term is defined as 
the opposite. We exclude the data from years 1999, 2000 and 2001 as discussed earlier. The 
analysis aims to look at the effect of different portfolio groups belonging to same specific 
blockholders, regardless of the blockholders classification in the focal firms.  
 
We implement the following regression model to investigate at the difference between the 
blockholders classification as short-term and long-term in the peer firms.  
 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  β0 + β1𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅 𝐸𝑇𝑅(𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔_𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜)𝑖,𝑡−1
+ β2𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅 𝐸𝑇𝑅(𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡_𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜)𝑖,𝑡−1 + β3𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 + β4𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1
+ β5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + β6𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + β7𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + β8𝛥 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + β9𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
+ β10𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + β11𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + β12𝐹_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + β13𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1
+ β14𝑅_𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + β15𝑅_𝐷_𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + β16𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐹𝐸




From table 4 panel A, we see that the focal firms’ follows their blockholders short-term sub-
portfolio, to a greater extent than the long-term sub-portfolio. An increase (decrease) in peer 
ETR for the short-term portfolio by 1% point, leads to focal firm increase (decrease) its 
GAAP ETR by 0.108 % point the following year. While an increase (decrease) in peer ETR 
for the long-term portfolio by 1% point, leads to focal firm increase (decrease) its GAAP ETR 
by 0.065 % point the following year. Both results are significant at the 1% level. 
 
In panel B, we repeat the analysis with Cash ETR. The ETR coefficient for short-term 
portfolio firms is 0.193 and significant at the 1% level, while the ETR coefficient for long-
term portfolio firms is 0.066 and significant at the 5% level. 
 
Results from both tax avoidance measures supports our H.2.2. The tax avoidance effects are 
stronger in the short-run then the long-run.  
 
IX. Supplementary empirical analysis 
 
9.1 Differences in the peer ETR effect: peer firms connected by the largest blockholder 
versus peer firms connected by other blockholders 
 
A problem with baseline analysis is that a focal firm can have many different CIBs each year. 
In this way, we cannot know whether the different CIBs for each company have the same 
preferences for tax planning. Cheng, Sun & Xie (2018) refer to this problem as «the concern 
of multiple common institutional blockholders.» It is essentially the same issue we looked at 
when analyzing differences between long-term and short-term blockholders. 
 
Cheng, Sun & Xie (2018) argue in their study that the largest common blockholders have the 
greatest ability to influence a firm’s tax planning. They restrict their sample by only looking 
at the largest CIB’s.  
 
In our analysis, we include both the largest CIB and the remaining CIBs in the focal firms. 
Hence, we look at the difference between how these two different groups of peer firm ETR’s 
might explain changes in focal firms ETR. In this way, we can see the different impacts 





largest blockholder in the focal firms is called peer_etr_largest, while for the remaining 
blockholders peer firms are included in the variable peer_etr_rest. 
 
We calculate peer ETR in two rounds. First, we subset the database by looking only at the 
CIBs in the focal firm, which is the largest in the respective year. Then the weighted market-
capitalized peer ETR is calculated for the entire portfolio of the respective CIBs in the given 
year, excluding the focal firm itself. The procedure is done for all the different firms per year, 
across all years in the sample. 
 
Next, we follow the same procedure, but we only look at blockholders which are not the 
largest in focal firms. We end up with two different datasets with different peer ETRs. Firstly, 
this gives us a table with peer ETR for the smallest CIBs in a focal firm, and secondly, a table 
with peer ETR for the largest CIBs for the focal firm.  
 
Finally, the datasets are merged to only firm-year observations that contain both peer ETR for 
the largest CIBs and peer ETR for the smallest CIBs. In other words, we only look at the 
observations where the focal firm both has a CIB, which is the largest CIB, but where the 
focal firm also has some remaining CIBs. For example, an observation with a calculated value 
of peer_etr_largest and a missing value of peer_etr_rest will be dropped from the analysis. In 
this way, we capture the difference between the two groups. 
We examine the difference between peer firms connected through the two groups of 
blockholders at the focal firms. Hence, we examine which portfolio impacts focal firms ETR 
with the following regression: 
 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  β0 + β1𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅 𝐸𝑇𝑅(𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑡)𝑖,𝑡−1 + β2𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅 𝐸𝑇𝑅(𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡)𝑖,𝑡−1 + β3𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1
+ β4𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + β5𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + β6𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 + β7𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + β8𝛥 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1
+ β9𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + β10𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + β11𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + β12𝐹_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1
+ β13𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + β14𝑅_𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + β15𝑅_𝐷_𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + β16𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐹𝐸 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
Our findings in Table 5 remove some of the problems that different CIBs may have different 
tax planning preferences, and we find that the effect for peer_etr_largest is still positive and 
significant. In other words, the effect goes in the same direction as peer_etr_rest. The findings 
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do not fully support the argument by Cheng, Sun & Xie (2018)  that “the largest common 
institutional blockholder is likely to influence firms’ tax avoidance policies to a greater extent 
than other CIBs.” Thus, we like to empathize that peer_etr_rest still contains a large group of 
peer firms. 
 
From panel A we see that the coefficient of peer_etr_largest is 0.076 while peer_etr_rest is 
0.163 when using GAAP ETR as a tax avoidance measure. These coefficients are significant 
at the 1% level. 
 
In panel B, the difference between the coefficients is still similar in magnitude. However, with 
Cash ETR as a tax avoidance measure, the ETR adjustment towards peer_etr_largest is 
greater in magnitude. Both groups of peer ETR are significant at the 1% level. 
 
This means that the largest CIBs do indeed have a great impact on a firm’s tax avoidance.  
 
X. Empirical analysis: robustness tests 
 
10.1 Firm fixed effects 
 
We test whether the results are robust to firm fixed effects. The main reason not to use this 
approach is that it removes time-constant variation, which we want to capture for this 
research. Thus, some relevant variations are removed. We refer to the discussion about 
strategic reaction for a better explanation. 
 
Generally, the main reason for using fixed effects at fixed levels is that unobservable 
heterogeneity can lead to bias in the estimators. A correlation between an unobservable 
variable and the variable we are interested in will lead to bias in the variable we are interested 
in (i.e., bias in peer ETR). With fixed effects at the individual level, we remove the sources of 
bias from unobservable time-constant variables (Collischon & Eberl, 2020). 
 






𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  β0 + β1𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,t−1 + β2𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 + β3𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + β4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + β5𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1
+ β6𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + β7𝛥 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + β8𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + β9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ β10𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + β11𝐹_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + β12𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + β13𝑅_𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
+ β14𝑅_𝐷_𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + β15𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐹𝐸 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
The results can be found in table 6, panel A and B. With firm fixed effects, we only look at 
the variation within the firms that varies over time but not at the variation that only varies 
across the companies and is constant. The regressions also include yearly fixed effects, and 
we remove variation over time, which is constant between the firms. In this way, 
unobservable variables that only vary over time (within variance) or vary only across 
companies (between variation) are omitted from the regression (Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, 2018). 
The effect of peer ETR on the focal firm’s ETR remains significant and high in magnitude, 
both when using GAAP ETR and cash ETR as tax avoidance measures. See table 7, panels A 
and B. 
 
10.2 Peer firm restriction based on SIC 
 
There are several different methods of defining peer groups of a focal firm. Previous studies 
in tax avoidance and peer effects define peer groups as firms within the same industry or 
different variants of this definition (Bird & Karolyi, 2017; Bird & Karolyi, 2018). 
 
Our approach, similar to Cheng, Sun & Xie (2018), identities peer companies by looking at 
each firm’s CIBs in the calendar year and then weighing ETRs based on a common investor 
base, excluding the focal firm itself. Our baseline analysis does not know whether the focal 
firm and its peer firms operate in the same industry. 
 
In the study by Heitzman & Ogneva (2019), tax policy is a potential specific channel for the 
systematic risk of tax policies will change, affecting after-tax cashflows. If investors believe 
that industry-driven tax planning increases the firm’s non-diversifiable cash flow shocks, they 
require a higher risk premium for firms that belong to a high tax planning industry. Then it is 
natural that some of the effects come from the fact that focal firm and peer firm are within the 
same industry and have the same exogenous characteristics since an investor may have 
investments in several companies within the same industry. Firms organize their tax planning 
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strategies around industry-specific incentives and opportunities, and they also respond to 
other firms within the same industry because of competitive and strategic reasons (Armstrong, 
Glaeser, & Kepler, 2019; Bird, Edwards, & Ruchti, Taxes and Peer Effects, 2018; Kubick, 
Lynch, Mayberry, & Omer, 2015). Tax laws are industry-centric; hence, tax enforcement 
structures around taxpayers’ operating industries (Heitzman & Ogneva, 2019) 
 
As described in the section about the reflection problem, it may be that a firm follows the 
dominant tax strategy within the industry. In this way, we lose track of whether the effect is 
driven by investors or because focal firms and peer firms are in the same industry. An 
overview of peer firms operating in the same industry is presented in table 1.2. 
 
We examine whether the investors are driving the effect, but not the companies being in the 
same industry. Our baseline analysis contains components of both effects. We want to see if 
the effect still holds if we force peer firms that share the same industry with a focal firm out of 
the CIBs portfolio. We are aware that we lose several ETR contributions from investors with 
holdings in both focal and peer firms, where peer firms have the same industry code as the 
focal firm. The effect will contain both a component of a direct effect from the investors and 
an indirect effect of focal firms and peer firms being in the same industry. This study 
contributes to minimizing the later effect.  
 
Because of this reason, we consider this analysis to be a robustness test to our baseline 
regression. We expect the effect to fall somewhat as the industry codes go from 4-digit to 2-
digit. The 1-digit SIC represents a division, while the 2-digit SIC codes represent a significant 
group, the 3-digit stands for the industry group, and the 4-digit present industry sector. The 
effect of peer firms on the focal firm decreases as we use 4-, 3- and 2-digit SIC codes, 
respectively.  
 
When weighting of ETR according to the blockholders market capital portfolio, we exclude 
companies that share the same SIC-code with the focal firm from the weighting. In other 
words, total market capitalization in the blockholders’ portfolio will not include the excluded 
firms so that the weighting is not skewed. Each firm’s market capitalization is aggregated to 






We estimate the following three models, where peer_ETR is calculated as stated below. For 
the first model, peer firms with the same 4-digit SIC as the focal firm are excluded. For the 
second model, peer firms with the same 3-digit SIC are excluded. Lastly, peer firms with the 
same 2-digit SIC are excluded: 
 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  β0 + β1𝑃𝐸𝐸𝑅 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1 + β2𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡−1 + β3𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡−1 + β4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + β5𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1
+ β6𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + β7𝛥 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + β8𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1 + β9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ β10𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 + β11𝐹_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + β12𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + β13𝑅_𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1
+ β14𝑅_𝐷_𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + β15𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌_𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐹𝐸 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 
 
From table 7, the peer effect on the focal firm’s decreases as the SIC-code restriction becomes 
coarser and coarser. Panel A (GAAP_ETR) shows a 1%-point increase in peer_ETR resulting 
in the focal firm’s GAAP_ETR increase with 0.164% point in the following year, using a 4-
digit SIC restriction. In the 3-digit SIC restriction and 2-digit SIC restriction analysis, the 
corresponding coefficients are 0.158 and 0.165, respectively. The results remain significant at 
the 1% level. 
 
In panel B, the coefficients for 4, 3, and 2-digit SIC restrictions are 0.187, 0.178, and 0.174, 
respectively. All the results remain significant at the 1% level.  
 
In conclusion, our finding indicates that the focal firm’s tax avoidance is not only driven by 
the indirect component since peer firms operate in the same industry as the focal firm. Hence, 
this result supports that the managers are more likely to drive the effect. Thus, we can 
conclude that some of the firms in peer groups being in the same industry do not interfere 
with our main research question: “Do firms engage in similar levels of tax avoidance if the 
same blockholders own them?” 
 
10.3 Event study on shocks in peer ETR’s 
 
We study the impact of peer firms’ tax rate shocks measured by the reaction of the focal firm 
indices of several tax shocks observed in 1999-2016. We apply the event study methodology 
to the firm-specific financial information and other factors that measure tax avoidance 
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behaviour as control variables. The approach will allow us to identify the reactions of the 
focal firm’s tax rate given exogenous events, i.e., tax shocks in the peer firms. 
Cheng, Sun & Xie (2018) points out the possibility that investors might build their portfolios 
based on “ex-ante” preferences for tax avoidance. Peer_etr is endogenous, and the firms do 
not follow each other based upon CIB mechanisms. In comparison, the two CIB mechanisms 
are the possibility that the investors influence the firm’s management or the second possibility 
that management looks towards their investor’s other portfolio firms. 
 
This regression aims to solve the endogeneity problem, using exogenous ETR shocks in peer 
firms. We constructed two arguably exogenous variables, Negative shock year (The year of 
the negative shock peer ETR) and Positive shock year (the year of positive shock in peer 
ETR), through several parsimonious steps. A change in peer tax rate is measured by taking 
peer ETR in the firm-year (t) minus peer ETR in the year before (t-1).  
 
We set up a dummy variable equal to 1 if the peer ETR is either larger or equal to 5% and 
smaller than 10% in absolute terms. Then we do the same procedure with a change in peer 
ETR larger than 10% in absolute terms. The dummies that capture shocks in year t are lagged 
and led to years before and after the shock. We also exclude the shock year (t+1). Hence, the 
dummy for the year before the shock year is in the reference group. Furthermore, we bin the 
remaining years in the dummies “5+ years after (before) neg(pos) shock”. Our set of control 
variables are included, and we make use of firm fixed effects and year fixed effects to get the 
most unbiased results.   
 
We conduct the following regression: 
 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  β0 + β1 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + β2𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + β3𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + β4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + β5𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡
+ β6𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + β7𝛥 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + β8𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + β9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + β10𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡
+ β11𝐹_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + β12𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + β13𝑅_𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + β14𝑅_𝐷_𝐵𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 +  β15𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀_𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐹𝐸 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
 
Both panel A and panel B of Table 9 provides exciting results when using GAAP ETR and 
cash ETR as measurements of tax avoidance. For GAAP_ETR (panel A), there is a clear pre-





shock, there is an abnormally high GAAP ETR in the focal firm. In the event year, the focal 
firm’s ETR already decreases. The decrease in GAAP ETR in one firm in the peer group also 
contributes to a shock in ETR across the peer group. 
 
Let us consider three firms, firm A, B, and C, as a peer group. A decrease in GAAP ETR for 
firm A will contribute to a shock in the peer group of firm B (containing firm A and C). 
Furthermore, the decrease in GAAP ETR for firm A will contribute to a shock in the peer 
group of firm C (containing firm A and B). Thus, there is always a rotation in the peer groups. 
 
Firms do indeed follow an arguably exogenous negative shock in peer ETR for GAAP ETR. 
The results persist over the years, assuring us that the peer ETR is exogenous and not 
endogenous because investors might build their portfolios based on “ex-ante” preferences for 
tax avoidance.  
 
The same logic goes for positive shock in peer ETR when using GAAP ETR as a tax 
avoidance measure. However, the results do not persist in the same magnitude as the negative 
peer ETR shocks. When the shock in GAAP peer ETR is above 10% in absolute terms, we do 
not find similar results. However, there are also more minor tax shocks in this range. 
 
We conduct the same analysis using cash ETR as a tax avoidance measure in panel B of Table 
8. When the positive shocks in cash peer ETR are between 5-10%, we see a clear pre-trend 
and post-trend. Before a positive shock in cash peer ETR, firms have an abnormally low cash 
ETR. In the shock year, they have an abnormally high cash ETR, which contributes to the 
shock in the peer groups. In the years following the positive shocks, there is a clear post-trend 
with abnormally high cash ETR. The same story goes when there are shocks in cash peer ETR 
greater than 10%. We do not see a pre-trend, but the post-trend seems systematic. Thus, firms 
do indeed follow positive cash ETR shock in the peer group. 
 
As for negative cash peer ETR shock, we have some exciting results. When the negative 
shocks are between 5-10% in absolute terms, we do indeed see a pre-trend with abnormally 
high cash ETR. There is also an indication of this when the shock is more significant than 
10% in absolute terms. The abnormally high cash ETR is not the case in the shock year, 





However, in the years after there are some interesting effects. We can see abnormally high 
cash ETR in the years following negative cash ETR shocks in peer groups. This brings us to 
the idea that investors might change their investment when there is a negative cash ETR shock 
in their portfolio firms. In the next section, we analyse what investors do with their portfolio 
weights using a similar event study approach. 
 
Below, we discuss some findings in the literature to explain what might be going on. 
 
As discussed above, some literature explains why we see an increase in the firms’ ETR after 
the peer firms are exposed to a negative shock. Dobrzynski (1993) and Monks & Minow 
(2011) argue that large shareholders monitor and discipline managers to ensure that their 
investment strategies are consistent with maximizing long-term value instead of short-term 
earning goals. In our context, we can assess developments in tax avoidance and interpret the 
results based on what provides the highest firm value in the long run. Chen, Chen, Cheng & 
Shevlin (2010) argues that long-term institutional shareholders must consider a trade-off 
between tax savings through tax avoidance strategies and associated reputation damage and 
penalties if later ruled improper. 
 
Thus, one mechanism could be that if firms included in an investor’s portfolio experience a 
negative cash ETR shock, the investor will react by reducing their investment in the 
respective firms. Hence, the investors are trying to normalize tax avoidance within their 
portfolios to a more normalized level. In this way, abnormal changes to tax avoidance do not 
reflect poorly on the investor due to reputation damages. In conclusion, we argue that the 
effects are due to long-term institutional shareholders concerned about reputation damage and 
try to reverse abnormal levels of tax avoidance on a portfolio level. 
 
For descriptive statistics over the shocks in our sample, see appendix B. 
 
10.4 Event Study on shocks in ETR’s on the investor-level 
 
Cheng, Sun & Xie (2018) sheds light on the endogeneity problem in which the blockholders 
chooses to hold firms with similar tax avoidance. Thus, the blockholders build their portfolios 





Cheng, Sun & Xie (2018) describes this potential mechanism as the “self-selection 
hypothesis”. In the previous event study, we introduced exogenous shocks in the peer ETR’s 
to solve the endogeneity problem. However, it is also worth investigating how blockholders 
build their portfolios on a “investor level”. 
 
To further investigate whether institutional blockholders may build their portfolio based on 
“ex-ante” preferences for tax avoidance, we conduct one final analysis. In this analysis, we 
study whether shocks in the focal firm’s ETRs contribute to how blockholders weigh their 
holdings in those firms. 
 
This event study is similar to the one in the previous subsection. However, there are a few 
differences to consider. Firstly, we are on the investor level. Thus, every firm-investor 
combination are the cross-sectional units, whilst the time unit remains the same. Furthermore, 
we do not look at shocks in peer firm’s ETR, but the ETR’s of the individual firms 
themselves.  
 
Because, unlike the peer ETR, focal firm’s ETR is not weighted average of multiple ETR’s. 
Thus, focal firm’s ETR in nature will be more volatile. Therefore, we increase the shock-
range to 5%-15% changes in ETR for column (1) in table 10. For column (2) the shocks are 
greater than 15% in absolute terms. 
 
We refer to table 3 in chapter 4 about the ETR weighting process for the explanation for this 
analysis. We examine whether shocks in ETR’s (column 5 of Figure 2.2) contribute to 
changes in the weights (column 8 of Figure 2.2). Simply put, in the event study, we want to 
capture if the blockholders sell/buys shares as the ETRs of those firms change. 
 






















1 B 80  7 0.33 560 1955 0.2864 0.094526854 
1 C 90 6 0.34 540 1955 0.2762 0.093913043 
1 D 95 9 0.35 855 1955 0.4373 0.153060905 




We conduct the following regression analysis on the investor level: 
 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =  β0 + β1 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + β2𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑖,𝑡 + β3𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 + β4𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + β5𝑀𝐵𝑖,𝑡
+ β6𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + β7𝛥 𝑁𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + β8𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + β9𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + β10𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑡
+ β11𝐹_𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + β12𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + β13𝑅_𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + β14𝑅_𝐷_𝐵𝐿𝐴𝑁𝐾𝑖,𝑡 +  β15𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿_𝐹𝐸 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅_𝐹𝐸 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 
 
When using GAAP ETR as the tax avoidance measure, we experience 4,100 negative ETR 
shocks and 3,491 positive ETR shocks across the sample in the 5%-15% shock range. In the 
15%+ shock range, we experience 2,798 negative ETR shocks and 2,997 positive ETR 
shocks. 
 
When using cash ETR, we experience 6,686 negative ETR shocks and 7,573 positive ETR 
shocks in the 5%-15% shock range. Whereas the 15%+ shock range gives 4,568 negative 
ETR shocks and 5,844 positive ETR shocks. 
 
Table 9 panel A shows a portfolio weight decrease the year after a negative shock in firms 
GAAP ETR, but it does not seem to be systematic as it reverses the following year. 
Panel B is more interesting. When there is a negative shock in firms’ cash ETR between 5-
15%, the blockholders reduce their weights. This effect persists and seems systematic. 
Furthermore, this might explain why we are seeing abnormally high cash ETR following 
negative peer ETR shocks in the previous subsection. That is, the blockholders might change 
their portfolios towards firms with higher levels of cash ETR. Also, the reaction could also 
serve as a signal to management to reduce their aggressive tax avoidance, encouraging 
management to engage in less aggressive tax avoidance.  
 
In conclusion, the results also shed light on the “self-selection hypothesis”. However, in sum 
the results do not seem to be great enough in magnitude to conclude that investors build their 
portfolios based on “ex-ante” preferences for tax avoidance 6. Furthermore, our results 
indicate that institutional blockholders seem to dislike aggressive tax avoidance levels. This 
might be an interesting topic for further research. 
 
 
6 In unreported regression, we did not find a significant effect by ETR’s on the portfolio weights with individual 





XI. Limitations and Alternatives  
As with many studies, the design of the current study is subject to limitations.  
 
Although GAAP ETR is widely used in tax studies, it has posted some major drawbacks. First 
of all, it is based on only annual data, therefore causes significant year-to-year variation in the 
annual effective tax rate and undefined tax rates due to negative denominators that can 
obscure inferences about tax avoidance (Bird, Edwards, & Ruchti, 2018). We observe fully 
the firm’s tax avoidance behaviour allows endogenous variables to capture all firm’s 
accelerating deductions and deferring income for tax purposes relative to book purposes, 
reducing current taxes but increasing deferred taxes.  
 
In this case, GAAP ETR includes both current and deferred taxes; it will not fully reflect such 
forms for tax avoidance. A common method used by multinational enterprises is offering 
stock options to their employees. Firms get deductions when stock options are exercised. Still, 
GAAP ETR recognized no expense at either grant date or exercise date, which creates a 
permanent difference between book and tax accounting. Tax benefits are then added directly 
to equity rather than reducing current tax expenses. Current tax expenses are overstated 
compared to actual tax paid for firms which such a kind of tax deductions. Another problem 
can is, by using GAAP ETR, book accrual within tax expense such as valuation allowance 
and tax contingency reserve has not been considered in our model. 
 
It is a simplification of how we calculate the portion of current shares outstanding owned by 
investors. We take the number of shares from common ownership data (by Michael 
Sinkinson) registered per quarter and investor and use this to calculate the annual average of 
shares. The market capitalizations are the number of shares is multiplied with price per share 
close (fiscal). At the same time, the shares at the end of the accounting period times price per 
share close (fiscal), representing the actual market capitalization. 
 
Furthermore, we have experienced several instances that the sum of quarterly shares for all 
investors in a company from common ownership data has exceeded the cshoq (current shares 
outstanding quarterly) registered in Compustat/CRSP-merged quartal fundamentals for the 
same firm. This is also the case when summing quarterly shares data from common ownership 
data to yearly values and compare those values against csho (current shares outstanding 
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annual) from the Compustat/CRSP-merged annual fundamentals database. This may lead to 
measurement errors in the weighting of peer ETR and the calculation of institutional 
ownership in percent. 
 
We also have limited peer firms to firms that share a common institutional blockholder 
(Cheng, Sun, & Xie, 2018). Thus, a blockholder is defined as an investor who owns at least 
5% of current shares outstanding for at least one quarter throughout the year. It could also be 
interesting to look at peer firms connected by institutional owners who own less than 5% of 
current shares outstanding in both firms. 
 
Since we use effective tax rates as tax avoidance measures, we follow other researchers and 
delete loss year observations, where pre-tax income is negative or equal to zero. Therefore, 
we are only using a subsample of profitable firms. This is a limitation, and we are indeed 
exposed to «truncation bias» (Henry & Sansing, 2018). We suggest further researchers should 
consider using other measures of tax avoidance and not ETR’s.  
 
Furthermore, studies like Armstrong, Glaeser & Kepler (2019) winsorize ETRs to the unit 
interval between 0 and 1, while we have discretionarily chosen to drop firms with ETR’s 
outside the unit interval, both before and after calculation of peer ETR. It means that we have 
fewer measurement errors in our ETR’s but at the expense of a more unbalanced panel data 
model. Finally, we will emphasize that calendar years and financial years do not overlap 
perfectly, and that the fiscal year is compiled based on which calendar year most of the fiscal 
months are within. 
 
XII. Conclusion  
 
This paper is intended as a supplement to Cheng, Sun & Xie (2018) and we follow many of 
the same methods. First, like Cheng, Sun & Xie (2018), we look at whether firms with 
common institutional ownership engage in similar levels of tax avoidance. Furthermore, we 
follow their methodology using a lead-lag model to control events that affect both focal firms 
and peer firms within the same year. 
 
Unlike Cheng, Sun & Xie (2018), we perform several alternative regressions. We differentiate 





subsequent years and investors who do not. We have indications that tax avoidance 
mimicking is stronger towards peer firms where the investors recently placed their 
investments. In addition, we look at whether focal firms mimic ETR's of peer firms connected 
by their most significant investor. The result is partly supportive of Cheng, Sun & Xie (2018), 
who claims that the largest CIB's are likely to influence a firm's tax avoidance more than other 
CIB's. We agree with the statement, but whether the peer effect is more significant between 
two groups of peer firms has a lot to do with the number of peer firms connected inside the 
two different groups. We see that the peer effect of the largest CIB's is significant and goes in 
the same direction as the peer effect of other CIB's. Therefore, we can conclude that the 
largest CIB's at least significantly impact the company's tax avoidance. 
 
Furthermore, the results are robust for firm fixed effects, and we know that latent firm-level 
characteristics do not merely drive the peer effect. Another problem, in contrast to Cheng, Sun 
& Xie (2018), is that we have more firms in peer groups operating in the same industry. To 
see if the results are not driven by the fact firms operate in the same industry, we have 
developed simple techniques to see if such effects do not drive the results. We did this by 
omitting peer firms with the same SIC as the focal firm in the peer ETR calculation. We find 
that peer ETR is still significant with such peer firms excluded from the peer ETR calculation. 
 
To investigate the endogeneity problem further, we see how firms react to arguably 
exogenous shocks in peer ETR. When we use GAAP ETR as a tax avoidance measure, we 
indicate that peer ETR is exogenous since companies respond to shocks in peer ETR. It 
applies to both negative and positive peer ETR shocks. 
 
When we use cash ETR as a tax avoidance measure, the evidence is not as clear. The result is 
because we see an abnormally high cash ETR in the year following negative peer ETR 
shocks. 
 
Finally, we conduct an event study on the investor level to examine whether blockholders 
adjust their portfolio weights when there is a shock in the focal firm's ETR. When using 
GAAP ETR as a measure, we see no reaction. This result gives us further support that peer 
ETR based on GAAP ETR measure is exogenous. However, when using cash ETR as the 
measure for tax avoidance, we see that blockholders adjust their portfolios when there is a 
negative cash ETR shock for their portfolio firms. It helps us interpret why we experience 
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positive reactions to negative (cash) peer ETR shocks. Because when investors adjust their 
weights, possibly buying into firms with less aggressive tax avoidance, the peer ETR will 
automatically increase. The investor reaction could also signal to management to reduce their 
aggressive tax avoidance, making cash ETR increase further after a negative shock. Thus, the 
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics 
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our sample in section 8.2. It reports descriptive 
statistics of the variables, including our primary dependent variable: effective tax rate 
(GAAP_ETR and Cash ETR) and our primary independent variable of peer firm’s effective 
tax rate (PEER_ETR). Control variables including intangible assets (INTAN), institutional 
ownership (INST), market-to-book ratio (MB), loss carryforward (NOL), change in loss 
carryforward (DIFFNOL), property, plant, and equipment (PPE), profitability (ROA), market 
capitalization (MCAP), foreign income and loss (F_INC), equity income earnings (EQINC), 
leverage ratio (LEV), R&D (R_D), blank R&D (R_D_BLANK), Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI). Appendix A provides definitions of variables. The GAAP ETR sample consists of 
23,303 firm-year observations from the year 1999 to 2016, while the cash ETR sample 
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consists of 23,015 firm-year observations. The tables show statistics after winsorizing the 
control variables; INTAN, INST, MB, DIFFNOL, PPE, ROA, MKTCAP, F_INC, EQINC, 
LEV, and R_D, to the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
Panel A: GAAP ETR sample 
 
Statistic N Mean Q1 Median Q3 St. Dev. 
GAAP_ETR 23,603 0.327 0.281 0.349 0.384 0.123 
peer_etr 23,603 0.321 0.303 0.321 0.341 0.039 
intan 23,603 0.180 0.015 0.117 0.291 0.190 
inst 23,603 0.663 0.483 0.710 0.866 0.254 
mb 23,603 3.101 1.415 2.231 3.656 4.331 
nol 23,603 0.452 0 0 1 0.498 
diffnol 23,603 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.061 
ppe 23,603 0.249 0.085 0.182 0.348 0.215 
roa 23,603 0.105 0.052 0.089 0.141 0.076 
mktcap 23,603 4,102.130 245.453 821.226 2,805.987 9,980.648 
f_inc 23,603 0.018 0 0 0.03 0.033 
eqinc 23,603 0.001 0 0 0 0.003 
lev 23,603 0.171 0.001 0.133 0.276 0.179 
r_d 23,603 0.049 0.004 0.02 0.1 0.063 
r_d_blank 23,603 0.359 0 0 1 0.480 
HHI 23,603 978.521 499.382 655.468 1,162.065 816.045 
 
Panel B: Cash ETR sample 
 
Statistic N Mean Q1 Median Q3 St. Dev. 
CASH_ETR 23,015 0.255 0.122 0.250 0.351 0.173 
peer_etr 23,015 0.250 0.223 0.251 0.274 0.052 
intan 23,015 0.182 0.017 0.120 0.295 0.191 
inst 23,015 0.666 0.488 0.713 0.869 0.253 
mb 23,015 3.121 1.443 2.267 3.693 4.342 
nol 23,015 0.460 0 0 1 0.498 
diffnol 23,015 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.062 
ppe 23,015 0.244 0.083 0.178 0.339 0.212 
roa 23,015 0.107 0.054 0.090 0.142 0.074 
mktcap 23,015 4,162.405 251.975 836.444 2,854.822 10,082.350 
f_inc 23,015 0.019 0 0 0.03 0.033 





lev 23,015 0.169 0.001 0.129 0.274 0.179 
r_d 23,015 0.048 0.005 0.02 0.1 0.060 
r_d_blank 23,015 0.351 0 0 1 0.477 
HHI 23,015 969.118 498.898 651.794 1,149.243 804.105 
 
Table 1.2: SIC statistics of peer groups 
 
A peer group is identified by looking at the unique CIBs in our sample and their 
corresponding portfolio. The average of CIBs with shares in firms with the same SIC is 
calculated by counting the number of firms in the portfolio and the number of those firms’ 
unique SIC’s. First, the calculation is done yearly, and then we calculate the mean across all 
the years in the sample to get the numbers below. This table represents statistics for all U.S. 
incorporated firms which do not operate in the unity or financial industry before any filtering 
(e.g., negative pretax-income). For results in our filtered sample, see section 10.3. 
 
Number of unique CIB’s 2,478 
Average of CIBs with shares in firms sharing the same 4-digit SIC 5.74% 
Average of CIBs with shares in firms sharing the same 3-digit SIC 8,21% 
Average of CIBs with shares in firms sharing the same 2-digit SIC 11,62% 
Average of CIBs with shares in firms sharing the same 1-digit SIC 19,83% 
 
Table 2: Baseline regression 
 
Table for section 8.5. 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results of associations between firm’s tax avoidance 
and their CIB’s peer for the pooled sample. The dependent variable is the focal firm’s 
effective tax rate (GAAP_ETR and CASH_ETR), an independent variable is peer firms’ 
effective tax rate (PEER_ETR). For a focal firm I in year t, we use its holding information in 
year t-1 to determine its CIB peers. Appendix A provides definitions of control variables. We 
control for both year and industry fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm level. *, 
**, *** indicates significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 
Panel A: GAAP ETR 
Baseline regression analysis 
 Dependent variable: Focal firm’s GAAP ETR (t) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
peer_etr (t-1) 0.330*** 0.202*** 0.187*** 
 (0.029) (0.027) (0.026) 
intan (t-1)  0.020*** 0.021*** 
  (0.006) (0.007) 
inst (t-1)  0.004 0.005 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
lev (t-1)  0.013* 0.012 
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  (0.007) (0.007) 
mb (t-1)  0.00004 -0.00001 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) 
nol (t-1)  -0.008*** -0.010*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
diffnol (t-1)  -0.021 -0.026 
  (0.024) (0.024) 
ppe (t-1)  0.001 0.007 
  (0.007) (0.008) 
roa (t-1)  0.154*** 0.153*** 
  (0.015) (0.015) 
log_mktcap (t-1)  -0.004*** -0.005*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
f_inc (t-1)  -0.655*** -0.556*** 
  (0.046) (0.046) 
eqinc (t-1)  -0.836** -0.701** 
  (0.351) (0.344) 
r_d (t-1)  -0.207*** -0.179*** 
  (0.023) (0.027) 
r_d_blank (t-1)  0.032*** 0.019*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) 
HHI (t-1)  0.00000* -0.00001** 
  (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Constant 0.226***   
 (0.009)   
Control variables No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes 
Observations 17,003 17,003 17,003 
R2 0.012 0.120 0.158 
Significance levels *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Panel B: Cash ETR 
 
Baseline regression analysis 
 Dependent variable: Focal firm’s cash ETR (t) 





peer_etr (t-1) 0.247*** 0.224*** 0.197*** 
 (0.029) (0.028) (0.027) 
intan (t-1)  0.022** 0.039*** 
  (0.011) (0.012) 
inst (t-1)  -0.008 -0.007 
  (0.008) (0.008) 
lev (t-1)  -0.034*** -0.045*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) 
mb (t-1)  -0.002*** -0.002*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0004) 
nol (t-1)  -0.030*** -0.028*** 
  (0.004) (0.003) 
diffnol (t-1)  0.082*** 0.076*** 
  (0.030) (0.029) 
ppe (t-1)  -0.081*** -0.047*** 
  (0.011) (0.013) 
roa (t-1)  0.326*** 0.299*** 
  (0.023) (0.023) 
log_mktcap (t-1)  0.0002 0.0001 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
f_inc (t-1)  -0.084 0.004 
  (0.062) (0.063) 
eqinc (t-1)  -0.309 -0.264 
  (0.507) (0.489) 
r_d (t-1)  -0.383*** -0.271*** 
  (0.033) (0.038) 
r_d_blank (t-1)  0.022*** 0.030*** 
  (0.004) (0.005) 
HHI (t-1)  0.00001*** 0.00001 
  (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Constant 0.204***   
 (0.008)   
Control variables No Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes 
Observations 16,638 16,638 16,638 
R2 0.006 0.072 0.102 




Table 3: Long-term vs. short-term blockholders in focal firms 
 
Regression for section 8.6. Dependent variable is focal firm’s ETR in year t. Both 
independent and control variables are in year t-1. Control variables abbreviations are 
explained in Appendix A.  
 
Panel A: GAAP ETR 
 
Analysis: Long-term vs. short-term CIB's 
 Dependent variable: Focal firm's GAAP ETR (t) 
peer_etr_long (t-1) 0.085* 
 (0.046) 
peer_etr_short (t-1) 0.076** 
 (0.035) 
intan (t-1) 0.013 
 (0.012) 
inst (t-1) 0.014 
 (0.009) 
lev (t-1) -0.004 
 (0.014) 
mb (t-1) 0.0002 
 (0.0004) 
nol (t-1) -0.001 
 (0.003) 
diffnol (t-1) 0.016 
 (0.036) 
ppe (t-1) 0.001 
 (0.014) 
roa (t-1) 0.180*** 
 (0.024) 
log_mktcap (t-1) -0.006*** 
 (0.001) 
f_inc (t-1) -0.619*** 
 (0.064) 






r_d (t-1) -0.154*** 
 (0.047) 
r_d_blank (t-1) 0.024*** 
 (0.005) 
HHI (t-1) -0.00000 
 (0.00000) 
Control variables Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Long-term definition: Blockholder for 4+ subsequent years 
Observations 5,621 
R2 0.197 
Significance levels *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Panel B: Cash ETR 
 
Analysis: Long-term vs. short-term CIB's 
 Dependent variable: Focal firm's cash ETR (t) 
peer_etr_long (t-1) 0.046 
 (0.043) 
peer_etr_short (t-1) 0.186*** 
 (0.044) 
intan (t-1) 0.033* 
 (0.018) 
inst (t-1) -0.006 
 (0.017) 
lev (t-1) -0.061*** 
 (0.019) 
mb (t-1) -0.002*** 
 (0.001) 
nol (t-1) -0.014*** 
 (0.005) 
diffnol (t-1) 0.172*** 
 (0.053) 




roa (t-1) 0.309*** 
 (0.038) 
log_mktcap (t-1) -0.002 
 (0.002) 
f_inc (t-1) -0.123 
 (0.088) 
eqinc (t-1) -1.035 
 (0.646) 
r_d (t-1) -0.227*** 
 (0.061) 
r_d_blank (t-1) 0.028*** 
 (0.007) 
HHI (t-1) 0.00001 
 (0.00001) 
Control variables Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Long-term definition: Blockholder for 4+ subsequent years 
Observations 5,593 
R2 0.118 
Significance levels *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 4: Long-term vs. short-term blockholder in peer firms 
 
Regression for section 8.7. Appendix A shows detailed explanations of control variables. We 
control for industry and firm fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
*, **, *** indicate significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   
 
Panel A: GAAP ETR 
 
Analysis: Long-term vs. short-term sub-portfolio's 
 Dependent variable: Focal firm's GAAP ETR (t) 
peer_etr_long-term_portfolio (t-1) 0.065*** 
 (0.023) 
peer_etr_short-term_portfolio (t-1) 0.108*** 
 (0.031) 






inst (t-1) 0.012** 
 (0.006) 
lev (t-1) 0.005 
 (0.009) 
mb (t-1) 0.0001 
 (0.0002) 
nol (t-1) -0.007*** 
 (0.002) 
diffnol (t-1) -0.028 
 (0.027) 
ppe (t-1) 0.006 
 (0.009) 
roa (t-1) 0.176*** 
 (0.016) 
log_mktcap (t-1) -0.005*** 
 (0.001) 
f_inc (t-1) -0.616*** 
 (0.048) 
eqinc (t-1) -0.981** 
 (0.396) 
r_d (t-1) -0.200*** 
 (0.034) 
r_d_blank (t-1) 0.020*** 
 (0.003) 
HHI (t-1) -0.00000 
 (0.00000) 
Control variables Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Long-term definition: Blockholder for 4+ subsequent years 
Observations 13,061 
R2 0.182 
Significance levels *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Panel B: Cash ETR 
Analysis: Long-term vs. short-term sub-portfolio's 
 Dependent variable: Focal firm's cash ETR (t) 
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peer_etr_long-term_portfolio (t-1) 0.066** 
 (0.027) 
peer_etr_short-term_portfolio (t-1) 0.193*** 
 (0.032) 
intan (t-1) 0.040*** 
 (0.013) 
inst (t-1) -0.003 
 (0.009) 
lev (t-1) -0.053*** 
 (0.013) 
mb (t-1) -0.002*** 
 (0.0004) 
nol (t-1) -0.023*** 
 (0.004) 
diffnol (t-1) 0.089*** 
 (0.032) 
ppe (t-1) -0.034** 
 (0.015) 
roa (t-1) 0.304*** 
 (0.025) 
log_mktcap (t-1) 0.001 
 (0.001) 
f_inc (t-1) -0.064 
 (0.067) 
eqinc (t-1) -0.286 
 (0.524) 
r_d (t-1) -0.304*** 
 (0.045) 
r_d_blank (t-1) 0.032*** 
 (0.005) 
HHI (t-1) 0.00001 
 (0.00001) 
Control variables Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 







Significance levels *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 5: Largest CIB regression 
 
Regression for section 9.1. Appendix A shows detailed explanations of control variables. We 
control for industry and firm fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
*, **, *** indicate significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.   
 
Panel A: GAAP ETR 
Largest CIB's regression 
 Dependent variable: Focal firm's GAAP ETR (t) 
peer_etr_largest (t-1) 0.076*** 
 (0.022) 
peer_etr_rest (t-1) 0.163*** 
 (0.029) 
intan (t-1) 0.020** 
 (0.008) 
inst (t-1) 0.003 
 (0.007) 
lev (t-1) 0.005 
 (0.009) 
mb (t-1) 0.0001 
 (0.0003) 
nol (t-1) -0.009*** 
 (0.002) 
diffnol (t-1) -0.024 
 (0.030) 
ppe (t-1) 0.009 
 (0.009) 
roa (t-1) 0.163*** 
 (0.017) 
log_mktcap (t-1) -0.005*** 
 (0.001) 
f_inc (t-1) -0.587*** 
 (0.054) 
eqinc (t-1) -0.803** 
 (0.377) 




r_d_blank (t-1) 0.019*** 
 (0.003) 
HHI (t-1) -0.00000* 
 (0.00000) 
Control variables Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Observations 12,709 
R2 0.174 
Significance levels *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Panel B: Cash ETR 
Largest CIB's regression 
 Dependent variable: Focal firm's cash ETR (t) 
peer_etr_largest (t-1) 0.117*** 
 (0.025) 
peer_etr_rest (t-1) 0.174*** 
 (0.031) 
intan (t-1) 0.014 
 (0.013) 
inst (t-1) -0.018* 
 (0.011) 
lev (t-1) -0.031** 
 (0.014) 
mb (t-1) -0.002*** 
 (0.0004) 
nol (t-1) -0.022*** 
 (0.004) 
diffnol (t-1) 0.169*** 
 (0.041) 
ppe (t-1) -0.078*** 
 (0.016) 
roa (t-1) 0.289*** 
 (0.025) 






f_inc (t-1) -0.017 
 (0.072) 
eqinc (t-1) 0.152 
 (0.502) 
r_d (t-1) -0.205*** 
 (0.044) 
r_d_blank (t-1) 0.028*** 
 (0.005) 
HHI (t-1) 0.00001* 
 (0.00000) 
Control variables Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Observations 11,477 
R2 0.109 
Significance levels *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 6: Firm fixed effects regression model 
 
Regression for section 10.1. 
 
This table presents the OLS regression results of associations between the firm’s tax 
avoidance and their CIB’s peer for the pooled sample with firm fixed effects. The dependent 
variable is the focal firm’s effective tax rate (GAAP_ETR and Cash_ETR). For a focal firm i 
in year t, we determine its CIB peers using holding information in year t-1. *, **, *** indicate 
significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 
Panel A: GAAP ETR 
Firm fixed effects regression 
 Dependent variable: Focal firm's GAAP ETR (t) 
peer_etr (t-1) 0.149*** 
 (0.029) 
intan (t-1) 0.016 
 (0.010) 
inst (t-1) 0.003 
 (0.007) 
lev (t-1) 0.009 
 (0.010) 




nol (t-1) -0.007** 
 (0.003) 
diffnol (t-1) -0.002 
 (0.025) 
ppe (t-1) -0.004 
 (0.010) 
roa (t-1) 0.149*** 
 (0.019) 
log_mktcap (t-1) -0.005*** 
 (0.001) 
f_inc (t-1) -0.508*** 
 (0.067) 
eqinc (t-1) -1.213*** 
 (0.427) 
r_d (t-1) -0.248*** 
 (0.033) 
r_d_blank (t-1) 0.031*** 
 (0.004) 
HHI (t-1) 0.00000 
 (0.00000) 
Control variables Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Observations 17,003 
R2 0.058 
Significance levels *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Panel B: Cash ETR 
Firm fixed effects regression 
 Dependent variable: Focal firm's cash ETR (t) 
peer_etr (t-1) 0.173*** 
 (0.029) 
intan (t-1) 0.049*** 
 (0.015) 
inst (t-1) 0.002 
 (0.011) 






mb (t-1) -0.002*** 
 (0.0004) 
nol (t-1) -0.026*** 
 (0.004) 
diffnol (t-1) 0.025 
 (0.029) 
ppe (t-1) -0.075*** 
 (0.015) 
roa (t-1) 0.350*** 
 (0.030) 
log_mktcap (t-1) -0.002 
 (0.002) 
f_inc (t-1) 0.050 
 (0.077) 
eqinc (t-1) -1.015 
 (0.696) 
r_d (t-1) -0.335*** 
 (0.044) 
r_d_blank (t-1) 0.015** 
 (0.006) 
HHI (t-1) 0.00001** 
 (0.00000) 
Control variables Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Observations 16,638 
R2 0.045 
Significance levels *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 7: SIC restrictions 
Regressions for section 10.2. Peer firms with the same SIC as focal firms are excluded in the 
peer ETR calculation. Dependent variable is focal firm’s ETR in year t. All other variables are 
in year t-1. Control variables abbreviations are explained in Appendix A. Year and industry 
fixed effects are controlled for, and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *,**, and 
*** indicate significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 




Panel A.1: 4-digit SIC restriction 
4-digit SIC restriction 
 Dependent variable: Focal firm's GAAP ETR (t) 
peer_etr (t-1) 0.164*** 
 (0.027) 
intan (t-1) 0.021*** 
 (0.007) 
inst (t-1) 0.004 
 (0.005) 
lev (t-1) 0.012 
 (0.007) 
mb (t-1) -0.00001 
 (0.0002) 
nol (t-1) -0.010*** 
 (0.002) 
diffnol (t-1) -0.026 
 (0.023) 
ppe (t-1) 0.007 
 (0.008) 
roa (t-1) 0.154*** 
 (0.014) 
log_mktcap (t-1) -0.005*** 
 (0.001) 
f_inc (t-1) -0.558*** 
 (0.045) 
eqinc (t-1) -0.704** 
 (0.342) 
r_d (t-1) -0.179*** 
 (0.028) 
r_d_blank (t-1) 0.019*** 
 (0.003) 
HHI (t-1) -0.00001** 
 (0.00000) 
Control variables Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 







Significance levels *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Panel A.2: 3-digit SIC restriction 
3-digit SIC restriction 
 Dependent variable: Focal firm's GAAP ETR (t) 
peer_etr (t-1) 0.158*** 
 (0.028) 
intan (t-1) 0.021*** 
 (0.007) 
inst (t-1) 0.004 
 (0.005) 
lev (t-1) 0.012 
 (0.008) 
mb (t-1) -0.00000 
 (0.0002) 
nol (t-1) -0.010*** 
 (0.002) 
diffnol (t-1) -0.025 
 (0.024) 
ppe (t-1) 0.007 
 (0.008) 
roa (t-1) 0.153*** 
 (0.014) 
log_mktcap (t-1) -0.005*** 
 (0.001) 
f_inc (t-1) -0.557*** 
 (0.046) 
eqinc (t-1) -0.690* 
 (0.352) 
r_d (t-1) -0.180*** 
 (0.028) 
r_d_blank (t-1) 0.019*** 
 (0.003) 
HHI (t-1) -0.00001** 
 (0.00000) 
Control variables Yes 
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Industry fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Observations 16,983 
R2 0.157 
Significance levels *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Panel A.3: 2-digit SIC restriction 
2-digit SIC restriction 
 Dependent variable: Focal firm's GAAP ETR (t) 
peer_etr (t-1) 0.165*** 
 (0.029) 
intan (t-1) 0.020*** 
 (0.007) 
inst (t-1) 0.004 
 (0.005) 
lev (t-1) 0.012 
 (0.007) 
mb (t-1) -0.00001 
 (0.0002) 
nol (t-1) -0.010*** 
 (0.002) 
diffnol (t-1) -0.026 
 (0.024) 
ppe (t-1) 0.007 
 (0.008) 
roa (t-1) 0.155*** 
 (0.014) 
log_mktcap (t-1) -0.005*** 
 (0.001) 
f_inc (t-1) -0.560*** 
 (0.045) 
eqinc (t-1) -0.766** 
 (0.343) 
r_d (t-1) -0.184*** 
 (0.028) 






HHI (t-1) -0.00001** 
 (0.00000) 
Control variables Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Observations 16,971 
R2 0.158 
Significance levels *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 
Panel B: Cash ETR 
Panel B.1: 4-digit SIC restriction 
4-digit SIC restriction 
 Dependent variable: Focal firm's cash ETR (t) 
peer_etr (t-1) 0.187*** 
 (0.028) 
intan (t-1) 0.039*** 
 (0.012) 
inst (t-1) -0.007 
 (0.008) 
lev (t-1) -0.045*** 
 (0.012) 
mb (t-1) -0.002*** 
 (0.0003) 
nol (t-1) -0.028*** 
 (0.003) 
diffnol (t-1) 0.076*** 
 (0.029) 
ppe (t-1) -0.046*** 
 (0.013) 
roa (t-1) 0.300*** 
 (0.022) 
log_mktcap (t-1) 0.0001 
 (0.001) 
f_inc (t-1) 0.005 
 (0.063) 




r_d (t-1) -0.274*** 
 (0.039) 
r_d_blank (t-1) 0.030*** 
 (0.005) 
HHI (t-1) 0.00000 
 (0.00000) 
Control variables Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Observations 16,626 
R2 0.101 
Significance levels *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Panel B.2: 3-digit SIC restriction 
3-digit SIC restriction 
 Dependent variable: Focal firm's cash ETR (t) 
peer_etr (t-1) 0.178*** 
 (0.028) 
intan (t-1) 0.040*** 
 (0.011) 
inst (t-1) -0.007 
 (0.008) 
lev (t-1) -0.045*** 
 (0.012) 
mb (t-1) -0.002*** 
 (0.0003) 
nol (t-1) -0.029*** 
 (0.003) 
diffnol (t-1) 0.079** 
 (0.031) 
ppe (t-1) -0.046*** 
 (0.014) 
roa (t-1) 0.299*** 
 (0.022) 






f_inc (t-1) 0.008 
 (0.061) 
eqinc (t-1) -0.265 
 (0.500) 
r_d (t-1) -0.270*** 
 (0.039) 
r_d_blank (t-1) 0.030*** 
 (0.005) 
HHI (t-1) 0.00000 
 (0.00000) 
Control variables Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Observations 16,618 
R2 0.101 
Significance levels *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Panel B.3: 2-digit SIC restriction 
2-digit SIC restriction 
 Dependent variable: Focal firm's cash ETR (t) 
peer_etr (t-1) 0.174*** 
 (0.027) 
intan (t-1) 0.040*** 
 (0.012) 
inst (t-1) -0.007 
 (0.008) 
lev (t-1) -0.045*** 
 (0.012) 
mb (t-1) -0.002*** 
 (0.0003) 
nol (t-1) -0.028*** 
 (0.003) 
diffnol (t-1) 0.078*** 
 (0.029) 
ppe (t-1) -0.046*** 
 (0.014) 




log_mktcap (t-1) 0.00004 
 (0.001) 
f_inc (t-1) 0.010 
 (0.062) 
eqinc (t-1) -0.311 
 (0.466) 
r_d (t-1) -0.269*** 
 (0.040) 
r_d_blank (t-1) 0.030*** 
 (0.005) 
HHI (t-1) 0.00000 
 (0.00000) 
Control variables Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes 
Observations 16,602 
R2 0.101 
Significance levels *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 8: Event study on shocks in peer ETR’s 
Regression for section 10.3. 
 
The table displays the results of peer effect on a firm’s tax avoidance using change in tax rate 
level as exogenous events. Year t is the event year when the tax rate is either increased or 
decreased. Independent variables are one_year_after_negative_shock and 
one_year_after_the_positive_shock. They capture the effect of a decrease/increase in peer’s 
tax rate on a focal firm in the year following the shock. Besides the control variables, we also 
control whether the effect is inherent before and persist after the shock. These control 
variables are 1-4+ years before positive/negative shocks and 1-5+years after positive/negative 
shocks. Columns (1) and (2) show the two different magnitudes of tax shocks, with a change 
between 5% and 10% and a change of more than 10%, respectively. We control for year, firm, 
and industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.   
 
Panel A: GAAP_ETR 
 
Event: Shock in GAAP peer ETR 
 Dependent variable: Focal firm's GAAP ETR 
 (1) (2) 





 (0.006) (0.014) 
4 years before neg shock 0.012* -0.005 
 (0.007) (0.018) 
3 years before neg shock 0.012* -0.015 
 (0.006) (0.015) 
2 years before neg shock 0.020*** -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.011) 
Negative shock year 0.003 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.011) 
1 year after neg shock 0.007 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.010) 
2 years after neg shock 0.005 -0.034*** 
 (0.006) (0.012) 
3 years after neg shock -0.009 -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.013) 
4 years after neg shock -0.010 -0.014 
 (0.007) (0.011) 
5+ years after neg shock -0.008 -0.019* 
 (0.007) (0.011) 
5+ years before pos shock 0.006 -0.010 
 (0.007) (0.014) 
4 years before pos shock 0.004 0.006 
 (0.009) (0.021) 
3 years before pos shock 0.012 0.012 
 (0.008) (0.014) 
2 years before pos shock 0.005 -0.0001 
 (0.007) (0.011) 
Positive shock year 0.010* 0.010 
 (0.005) (0.009) 
1 year after pos shock 0.017*** -0.0002 
 (0.006) (0.010) 
2 years after pos shock 0.016** -0.015 
 (0.007) (0.010) 
3 years after pos shock 0.001 -0.006 
 (0.007) (0.011) 
4 years after pos shock 0.001 0.016 
 (0.007) (0.015) 
5+ years after pos shock -0.002 -0.018 
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 (0.007) (0.013) 
intan 0.033*** 0.033*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
inst 0.008 0.006 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
lev -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
mb -0.0004 -0.0004 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) 
nol -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
diffnol 0.033 0.032 
 (0.023) (0.023) 
ppe -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
roa -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.017) (0.017) 
log_mktcap -0.0002 -0.0003 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
f_inc -0.559*** -0.559*** 
 (0.056) (0.057) 
eqinc -1.503*** -1.464*** 
 (0.418) (0.418) 
r_d -0.257*** -0.261*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) 
r_d_blank 0.032*** 0.032*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
HHI 0.00000 0.00000 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Shock 5% - 10% 10% -> 
Observations 23,603 23,603 
R2 0.053 0.052 
Significance levels *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
 






Event: Shock in cash peer ETR 
 Dependent variable: Focal firm's cash ETR 
 (1) (2) 
5+ years before neg shock -0.011 0.009 
 (0.007) (0.014) 
4 years before neg shock 0.012* 0.007 
 (0.007) (0.014) 
3 years before neg shock 0.011* 0.025* 
 (0.006) (0.013) 
2 years before neg shock 0.017*** -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.010) 
Negative shock year 0.008 -0.004 
 (0.005) (0.009) 
1 year after neg shock 0.011* -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.009) 
2 years after neg shock 0.020*** 0.030*** 
 (0.006) (0.011) 
3 years after neg shock 0.022*** 0.026** 
 (0.006) (0.011) 
4 years after neg shock 0.034*** 0.028** 
 (0.007) (0.011) 
5+ years after neg shock 0.027*** 0.028** 
 (0.007) (0.011) 
5+ years before pos shock 0.024*** 0.017 
 (0.007) (0.014) 
4 years before pos shock 0.007 -0.006 
 (0.006) (0.014) 
3 years before pos shock -0.012** -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.013) 
2 years before pos shock -0.011** -0.017 
 (0.005) (0.010) 
Positive shock year 0.016*** 0.016** 
 (0.005) (0.008) 
1 year after pos shock 0.027*** 0.017* 
 (0.006) (0.009) 
2 years after pos shock 0.020*** 0.024*** 
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 (0.006) (0.009) 
3 years after pos shock 0.016** 0.013 
 (0.006) (0.011) 
4 years after pos shock 0.022*** 0.023** 
 (0.008) (0.012) 
5+ years after pos shock 0.020*** 0.014 
 (0.007) (0.010) 
intan 0.048*** 0.053*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
inst -0.013 -0.002 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
lev -0.048*** -0.051*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
mb -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
nol -0.043*** -0.042*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
diffnol 0.090*** 0.090*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) 
ppe -0.070*** -0.065*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
roa -0.185*** -0.175*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) 
log_mktcap 0.001 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
f_inc -0.093 -0.077 
 (0.066) (0.067) 
eqinc -1.487** -1.525*** 
 (0.586) (0.586) 
r_d -0.172*** -0.187*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) 
r_d_blank 0.015*** 0.014*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
HHI 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 





Shock 5% - 10% 10% -> 
Observations 23,015 23,015 
R2 0.039 0.034 
Significance levels *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Table 9: Investor level event study 
 
Regression for section 10.4. 
 
Control variables abbreviations are explained in Appendix A. Year and individual fixed 
effects are controlled for, and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *,**, and *** 
indicate significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Panel A: GAAP ETR 
Event: Shock in GAAP ETR 
 Dependent variable: Blockholder's portfolio weight 
 (1) (2) 
5+ years before neg shock 0.003 -0.005 
 (0.004) (0.006) 
4 years before neg shock -0.003 -0.007 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
3 years before neg shock -0.0004 0.0003 
 (0.002) (0.005) 
2 years before neg shock 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
Negative shock year -0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
1 year after neg shock -0.006** 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
2 years after neg shock -0.0002 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
3 years after neg shock -0.003 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.006) 
4 years after neg shock -0.004 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.006) 
5+ years after neg shock -0.008 0.012 
 (0.005) (0.008) 
92 
 
5+ years before pos shock 0.0003 -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.006) 
4 years before pos shock -0.002 -0.0004 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
3 years before pos shock -0.004 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
2 years before pos shock -0.002 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.004) 
Positive shock year -0.001 0.006** 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
1 year after pos shock 0.003 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
2 years after pos shock 0.003 0.008 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
3 years after pos shock -0.003 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.007) 
4 years after pos shock -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.007) 
5+ years after pos shock -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
intan -0.021** -0.022** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
inst -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
lev 0.018** 0.018** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
mb 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) 
nol -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
diffnol -0.025 -0.021 
 (0.027) (0.027) 
ppe -0.016 -0.015 
 (0.016) (0.016) 
roa -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.015) (0.015) 
log_mktcap 0.019*** 0.019*** 





f_inc 0.010 0.014 
 (0.032) (0.032) 
eqinc 0.117 0.084 
 (0.294) (0.294) 
r_d 0.015 0.019 
 (0.030) (0.030) 
r_d_blank -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
HHI -0.00001** -0.00001** 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Shock 5% - 15% 15% -> 
Observations 79,506 79,506 
R2 0.006 0.006 
Significance levels *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Panel b: Cash ETR 
Event: Shock in cash ETR 
 Dependent variable: Blockholder's portfolio weight 
 (1) (2) 
5+ years before neg shock 0.006* -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
4 years before neg shock -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
3 years before neg shock 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
2 years before neg shock -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Negative shock year -0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
1 year after neg shock -0.004** -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
2 years after neg shock -0.005** 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
3 years after neg shock -0.009*** 0.005 
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 (0.002) (0.004) 
4 years after neg shock -0.008*** 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
5+ years after neg shock -0.007 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
5+ years before pos shock -0.0001 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
4 years before pos shock -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
3 years before pos shock -0.003 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
2 years before pos shock -0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Positive shock year -0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
1 year after pos shock 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
2 years after pos shock -0.002 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
3 years after pos shock -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
4 years after pos shock -0.002 -0.007** 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
5+ years after pos shock -0.0004 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
intan -0.021** -0.022** 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
inst -0.006 -0.007 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
lev 0.017** 0.017** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
mb 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) 
nol -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
diffnol -0.025 -0.028 
 (0.027) (0.027) 





 (0.016) (0.016) 
roa -0.002 0.002 
 (0.015) (0.016) 
log_mktcap 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
f_inc 0.011 0.013 
 (0.031) (0.032) 
eqinc 0.119 0.116 
 (0.294) (0.295) 
r_d 0.016 0.015 
 (0.030) (0.030) 
r_d_blank -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
HHI -0.00001** -0.00001** 
 (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Control variables Yes Yes 
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Shock 5% - 15% 15% -> 
Observations 79,506 79,506 
R2 0.006 0.006 




Appendix A: Variable definitions 
 
Measures of Tax Avoidance  
 
GAAP ETR  Effective tax rate (Compustat: TXT/PI). ϵ [0,1] 
 
CASH ETR Cash effective tax rate (Compustat: TXPD/PI), ϵ [0,1] 
 
Variables of interest 
 
Peer ETR  Based on GAAP ETR (CASH ETR) when using GAAP ETR (CASH ETR) as 
a tax avoidance measure 
 
Control Variables  
 





INTAN Intangibles assets: computed as reported intangibles (Compustat: INTAN) 
divided by total assets (Compustat: AT). Missing values of INTAN is set equal 
to 0 
 
INST  Institutional ownership %: Calculated in three stages. First shares (ownership 
data) / (Compustat: CSHOQ) to get institutional ownership of every investor 
for each quarter. In the next stage we sum the institutional ownership per firm 
each quarter. And in the last stage we take the mean/collapse the quarters to 
yearly values. 
 
LEV Leverage: computed as long-term debt (Compustat: DLTT) divided by total 
assets (Compustat: AT). Missing values of LEV is set equal to 0 
 
MB Market-to-book ratio: computed as the ratio of market value of equity 
(Compustat:  PRCC_F*CSHO) to book value of equity (Compustat: CEQ). 
Missing values of MB is set to 0 
 
NOL  Dummy equal to 1 if reported positive tax loss carryforward during the year 
(Compustat: TLCF) and 0 for rest 
 
DIFFNOL  Change in NOL: computed as the change in firm i’s NOL (Compustat: TLCF) 
between year t and year t-1, scaled by total assets (Compustat: AT) 
 
PPE  Property, plant and equipment: computed as net property, plant and equipment 
(Compustat: PPENT), divided by total assets (Compustat: AT). Missing values 
of PPE is set equal to 0 
 
LOG_MKTCAP  Log of total market capital (Compustat: PRCC_F*CSHO). Missing 
values is set to the mean across the sample 
 
F_INC Foreign pretax income (Compustat: PIFO) scaled by total assets (Compustat: 
AT). Missing values of F_INC is set to 0 
 
R_D  Research & Development: computed as R&D expenses (Compustat: XRD) 
scaled by total assets (Compustat: AT). Missing variables of R_D is set either 
industry average (2-digit SIC) where available or equal to 0  
 
R_D_Blank Dummy equal to 1 for missing values and 0 for non-missing values of R&D 
 
EQINC  Equity method earnings: computed as equity in earnings (Compustat: ESUB) 
divided by total assets (Compustat: AT). Missing observations of EQINC is set 
equal to 0 
 




Appendix B: Descriptive statistics of number of shocks in the sample from event study 






Panel A: GAAP ETR 
 
Descriptive statistics for Event study 
 
Interval → -5% >= SHOCK > -10% 5% <= SHOCK < 10% 
4 shocks for the same firm 0 1 
3 shocks for the same firm 7 6 
2 shocks for the same firm 75 49 
1 shock for the same firm 507 420 
SUM shocks 678 540 
 
Interval → -10% >= SHOCK  10% <= SHOCK  
3 shocks for the same firm 0 4 
2 shocks for the same firm 9 11 
1 shock for the same firm 198 197 
SUM shocks 216 231 
 
Panel B: Cash ETR 
 
Descriptive statistics for Event study 
 
Interval → -5% >= SHOCK > -10% 5% <= SHOCK < 10% 
5 shocks for the same firm 0 2 
4 shocks for the same firm 6 8 
3 shocks for the same firm 51 51 
2 shocks for the same firm 196 251 
1 shock for the same firm 802 834 
SUM shocks 1371 1531 
 
Interval → -10% >= SHOCK  10% <= SHOCK  
5 shocks for the same firm 0 1 
4 shocks for the same firm 0 1 
3 shocks for the same firm 9 6 
2 shocks for the same firm 49 52 
1 shock for the same firm 423 437 
SUM shocks 548 568 
 
 
Appendix C: Missing values handling 
 
Panel A: GAAP ETR sample 
   
Observations before 
introducing lag model 
23,603 





Net firm-year observations in 
the sample 
17,003 
Missing values for control variables in net sample 
Variable name Missing observations Handling 
intan (Intangible assets deflated by 
total assets) 
441 Set to 0. 
lev (Long term debt deflated by total 
assets) 
42 Set to 0. 
mb (Market value of equity deflated by 
book value of equity) 
5 Set to 0. 
ppe (Property, plant and equipment 
deflated by total assets) 
8 Set to 0. 
roa (Pre-tax income deflated by total 
assets) 
0 - 
log_mktcap (Natural log of market 
capitalization / market value of equity) 
4 Set to mean 
f_inc (Foreign pre-tax income deflated 
by total assets) 
7,209 This number is after replacing 
missing pifo with pi-pidom. 
Rest is set to 0. 
eqinc (Equity in earnings deflated by 
total assets) 
1,873 Set to 0. 
r_d (Research and development expense 
deflated by total assets) 
608 This number is after replacing 
missing values with industry 
average. Rest is set to 0. 
r_d_blank (dummy for missing 
values in research and development 
before replacement with industry 
average) 
0 - 
HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) 0 - 
inst (Institutional ownership %) 0 - 
tlcf (Tax loss carry forward) 4,556 Set to 0. 
diffnol (Difference in tax loss carry 
forward between year t and t-1) 
0 This is after setting tlcf to 0. 
nol (Dummy for positive tlcf) 0 This is after setting tlcf to 0. 
 







introducing lag model 
23,015 
Loss when introducing lag 
model 
(6,377) 
Net firm-year observations in 
the sample 
16,638 
Missing values for control variables in net sample 
Variable name Missing observations Handling 
intan (Intangible assets deflated by 
total assets) 
426 Set to 0. 
lev (Long term debt deflated by total 
assets) 
53 Set to 0. 
mb (Market value of equity deflated by 
book value of equity) 
1 Set to 0. 
ppe (Property, plant and equipment 
deflated by total assets) 
7 Set to 0. 
roa (Pre-tax income deflated by total 
assets) 
0 - 
log_mktcap (Natural log of market 
capitalization / market value of equity) 
0 - 
f_inc (Foreign pre-tax income deflated 
by total assets) 
6,842 This number is after replacing 
missing pifo with pi-pidom. 
Rest is set to 0. 
eqinc (Equity in earnings deflated by 
total assets) 
1,788 Set to 0. 
r_d (Research and development expense 
deflated by total assets) 
579 This number is after replacing 
missing values with industry 
average. Rest is set to 0. 
r_d_blank (dummy for missing 
values in research and development 
before replacement with industry 
average) 
0 - 
HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) 0 - 
inst (Institutional ownership %) 0 - 
tlcf (Tax loss carry forward) 4,429 Set to 0. 
100 
 
diffnol (Difference in tax loss carry 
forward between year t and t-1) 
0 This is after setting tlcf to 0. 
nol (Dummy for positive tlcf) 0 This is after setting tlcf to 0. 
 
 
